Remembering the 1965 War

 

Remembering the 1965 War

 The first Kashmir war did not end in a decisive solution for either contestant. Pakistanis felt frustrated and bitter while their leadership tried to hide behind the United Nations resolutions and similar excuses. On the other hand, Nehru, the man who had promoted himself as a person, symbolizing India, was generally content with what India had grabbed. He temporarily appeared sated like a cat after it polishes off the mouse. For him, Pakistan held Kashmir could wait for another day. 

The leadership in both countries, however, occasionally made noises about recovering the chunks of Kashmir they had lost to the other side. Breaking the inertia was the main motive for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 65 War. There are many theories about the causes of this war. The boilerplate explanation by the Pakistani leadership is the refusal by India to grant the right of selfdetermination to the Kashmiris. According to the proponents of this theory the Valley was simmering with unrest due to the inept Kashmiri leadership, high-handedness of the occupation administration, and perhaps because Indian leadership was contemplating withdrawing the special status accorded to the state under the Indian constitution. 

According to the Indian version, t h e PakistanArmy, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India. Some Pakistani theorists point out the growing frustration and resentment when the people started getting fed up with Ayub Khan, particularly after his controversial success in the 1964 general elections. Ayub Khan was losing his grip on power as new power centres emerged (Bhutto, the army, and Bengali autonomists). During the twilight of his rule (1964-68) Ayub Khan was not entirely in control of his government. 

Whatever the reason, Ayub Khan, unwittingly or in cohort with at least two power centres (Bhutto and some generals) took steps to break the inertia. There should be nothing to apologize about this and start a blame game. However, Ayub initiated a war without proper planning and with faulty appreciation.  Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency would result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations would remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility. 

Escalation 

Rann of Kutch, comprising an area of 30,000 square kilometers, is a seasonal salt marshland between the Indian state of Gujarat and the southern tip of Pakistan’s Sindh province. Due to its marshy nature, the area was not regularly patrolled on the Pakistani side. In 1951, Sind Police Rangers (Later renamed Indus Rangers) established a few posts along a track approximately 15 kilometers south of track Rahimki Bazaar - Nohar Varo-Nagar Parkar (the so-called Customs Track). 

In 1953, in pursuit of an economy of force (an excuse for dodging responsibility and doing nothing), even these posts were abandoned and the Rangers withdrew to the Customs Track. Indians were quick to encroach and establish their claim. On the night of 24 /25 February 1953, a company of Indian Reserve Police (predecessor to the Border Security Force) occupied Chadd Bed, a strip of semi-marshland located on Pakistan’s side of the northern Rann. Pakistani mandarins raised customary noises while the leaders on bothsides tried to discuss the dispute (Nehru- Noon, 1958; Lt Gen Sheikh-Swaran Singh, 1960). 

A long period of hibernation followed. In January 1965 the Indians woke up from their slumber, reinforced the area with approximately two BSF battalions, and their patrols started 3 probing forward towards the Rangers posts located along the Customs Track. There were accusations and counter-accusations by both sides about border violations. These were followed by attacks on each other's posts. Pakistanis blamed Indians for establishing new posts on their side of the border, particularly the SardarPost which was established in March 1965 on a high ground located to the southwest of Rahimki Bazaar. 

The ensuing skirmishes remained localized and, harking back to the era of the limited wars, the two air chiefs agreed on keeping their respective air forces out of the conflict. Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the southwest of the de facto international border. This was hailed as a great victory for Pakistan. Emboldened by the setback to the Indians, Major General Tikka Khan, GOC 8 Division, outlined a tactical plan called Plan Alpha to capture the northern half of the Rann. However, Ayub Khan did not allow such an offensive. Ayub Khan’s critics think he had missed an opportunity to push India further to the south (Ali, 2009; Gauhar, 1993). 

In June of 1965, at the behest of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, both countries agreed to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The clash had not resulted in a major gain for Pakistan. When the tribunal announced the award in 1968, Pakistan was awarded, against its claim of 9,100 square kilometers (3,500 square miles), approximately a marginal area of 910 square kilometers (350 square miles) to the south and east of Rahimki Bazaar including Chadd Bed. Indian claim on the whole of the Rann was rejected. The international boundary in this area was thus roughly delineated along the 1953 border line. 

For Ayub Khan, the outcome of the Rann of Kutch encounter was a victory for the Pakistan Army. This perceived victory made him draw t h e wrong conclusion that the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military move in Jammu & Kashmir even as it had failed to counter the Chinese onslaught in 1962. He was mistaken that the situation in the 4 Indian-held Kashmir was ripe for a popular uprising. Ayub Khan also mistakenly concluded that America would come to Pakistan’s assistance, even when the latter provoked a war with India. It is surprising to observe how he failed to register U.S. Ambassador Walter Mc McConaughy’s sternwarning to Pakistan against using U.S. arms in a conflict with India (Gill, 2004). 

Operation Gibraltar

T h e o p e r a t i o n called for infiltrating groups of “Mujahideen” comprising regular army troops and irregulars into IHK to contrive a local uprising and unfreeze the issue without provoking a general war (Hali,2012). It was almost going to be a replay of the first Kashmir war. Operation Gibraltar was a parody of guerrilla warfare. The mission assigned to the various infiltration groups was warfare in the enemy’s rear to create conditions for an open revolt against 5 the Indian occupation. The total strength of the “Gibraltar Force” was not more than 5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into nine forces. 

The operation surprised the Kashmiris more than the Indian Army. Instead of receiving help from the locals, most of the infiltrators were handed over by them to the Indian Army. Those who were not discovered were more pathetic since rations, ammunition, and supplies ran out. On 26 August, Indian 68 Brigade attacked Haji Pir Bulge in a pincer move.  Hopping from Bharakao (near Rawalpindi) to Rawalakot, Pakistan Army’s 20 Punjab reached the Sankh feature, a spur 8 kilometers West of Haji Pir, 0n 29 August. Indians attacked and captured Sankh on 30th August. 

This was the general pattern that characterised the skirmishes between the two armies. There was confusion all along the Pakistani frontline. Poor planning and poorer execution resulted in pulling out whole infantry battalions from their defensive positions by bleeding the holding brigades (Sectors) to beef up the infiltration forces. Some units were hastily moved into the area from their peacetime locations. When the Indians retaliated by attacking Pakistani posts all along the 1949 Cease Fire Line (CFL), the infiltrating units were recalled and asked to counterattack. There was little time for preparation. In the confusion of battle, companies lost contact with each other and their battalion headquarters. This resulted in the Indian capture of strategic areas like the Hajipir Pass and many heights in the Kargil Sector. 

Operation Grand Slam 

While the 12 Division was defending against repeated Indian attacks across the CFL, the Pakistan Army commenced Operation Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1 st September 1965 to ease the pressure on the 12 Division, and to guard against the threat to the important city of Muzaffarabad. The operation was limited to the disputed Jammu & Kashmir state. The Indian 191 Infantry Brigade defended Chamb, with, under 6 command, a squadron of AMX-13 tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the AMX-13 tanks, though possessing the same firepower as the Pakistani M47 and M48 Patton tanks, were outnumbered in this sector. 

Major General Akhtar Husain Malik, GOC 12 division, set up his headquarters at Kharian to execute the Chamb operation. Forces under his command were 3x infantry brigades (No.4 Sector, 10 Brigade, and 102 Brigade), 2x armoured regiments (ex 6 Armoured Division), and Artillery I Corps (Amin, 2000). Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces retreated from their defensive positions. Major General Yahya Khan, GOC 7 Division, replaced Major General Akhtar Malik on the second day of the attack. This delayed the attack by one day. This decision not only confused the Pakistani officer cadre, but the delay also permitted the Indians to rush reinforcements to the sector. When the attack recommenced on 3rd September, the Indian forces in this area were sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days, but they did not have the strength to launch a counterattack. The Pakistani attack staggered for two more days without any significant gains in territory. Like the other armies of the world, the Pakistan Army also has its “mutual admiration groups. One such group, glorifying GOC 12 Division, still maintains that, had the change of command at Akhnur Bridge not taken place, Major General Akhtar Husain Malik would have secured Akhnur- the gateway to the Kashmir Valley. 

 The Battle of Lahore 

To relieve pressure from Chamb, on the night of 5 /6 September India attacked Pakistan along the international border . The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani attack. Realizing the gravity of the threat,the Pakistani Army stopped its thrust into Kashmir and diverted 7 Division to counter the Indian incursion. At the Lahore front Indian XI Corps began its operations by advancing on three axes –15 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) was to attack Lahore along Amritsar – 7 Lahore axis (Wagah road), 7 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) to attack Burki along Khalra –Burki axis, and 4 Mountain Division ( two mountain brigades and an armour regiment) advancing along Khem Karan- Kasur axis was to capture Kasur. 

 Facing the Indians along the Amritsar-Lahore and Khalra-Burki axes was the 10 Division (seven infantry battalions within three infantry brigades, and an armour regiment). The Rann of Kutch clash resulted in the forward deployment of troops along the international border. The defensive positions were strengthened with barbed wire and mines. In the last week of July, the troops were ordered to dismantle the defences and return to barracks. When the Indians attacked, no mines or barbed wire protected the Pakistani defences. On persistence from his brigade commanders, GOC 10 Division permitted them to take up defensive positions during the night of 5 / 6 September, starting at midnight. This implied that the troops would not be in position before 0400 hours and defensive positions could not be occupied before 0700 hours, 6 September. Resultantly, infantry battalions, under-command armour elements, and line parties bumped into the attackers while occupying the assigned forward-defended localities/ artillery observation posts. None of the twenty-odd bridges were prepared for demolition. These were haphazardly blown up belatedly in the face of the stiff enemy pressure. While the enemy overran the advance positions, some elements of the 10 Division continued operating on the east bank of BRB Canal till the cease-fire.

 All the Indian Army attacks on forwarddefended localities were beaten back, mainly by artillery. The Indian claim that the invading divisions did not attempt to establish a bridgehead anywhere across the BRB Canal was rejected by Singh and Rikhye (1991). According to these Indian defence analysts, the Pakistan Army prevented the Indian Army from crossing the last defence before Lahore, the BRB (Icchogil) Canal just in time, and avoided a major defeat. Much of the credit has deservedly gone to a single company of the 3 Baluch Regiment which held up the Indians for several hours. 8 The leading brigade of the Indian 15 Infantry Division was about to throw abridgehead across the BRB Canal when it was attacked by the PAF F-86s (of No 19 Squadron, sic) that strafed it and other elements of the Division up and down the Grand Trunk Road, throwing the Indians into confusion, delaying the advance, and thus allowing Pakistan’s 10 Division to assume its forward positions, which ended the hope of a quick victory. But for the PAF, the weak Pakistani defence would have been overwhelmed and the Indian Army would have poured across the BRB Canal and into Lahore.By 22nd September, Indians, leaning on the water obstacle, had captured two major villages, Burki and Dograi, east of BRB. 

Kasur Sector

 In 1965, Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division was the only armoured division in theSubcontinent with 3x armoured brigades (3, 4, and 5). Pakistan Army launched the armoured division in the Kasur sector with a combat power superiority of 1.44 to 1.00. Despite its superiority in armour, Pakistan Army lacked mechanized infantry. It should be understood that mechanized infantry provides intimate infantry support to tanks. It assaults and clears the enemy defences overrun by tanks. 

 The Pakistani offensive in the Kasur Sector was launched in an area unsuitable for armour operations. The area in and around Asal Uttar, the battlefield, was easily inundated by the Indians through the canals and their distributaries cris- crossing its whole length and breadth. In 1965, fields of fire were available up to 1000 meters and were generally restricted by thick vegetation and standing crops. Trafficability was poor and. Tanks and APCs frequently bogged down in the slushy ground. Several armour battles took place around Asal Uttar between 8 and 11 September. The Indians employed their tanks like pillboxes. Utilizing standing crops, the attackers were engaged by the Indian tanks, artillery, and tank-hunting teams. Suffering heavy losses, Pakistanis retreated. During most of the attacks, the tanks were disabled on the minefields andeffectively engaged by the Indian artillery, anti-tank weapons, and tanks lying in 9 ambush under cover of sugar cane crops. Wherever they tried to outflank the defender, Pakistani tanks were either bogged down or were channelled by the inundations into killing areas where they were destroyed at leisure. “Do not reinforce a failure” is a constant refrain during the exercises yet this dictum is often thrown overboard during an actual war. By 11 September, having suffered heavy casualties, and with CO 4 Cavalry captured along with many of his officers, 1Armoured Division had lost its steam. According to Chakravorty (2014), Pakistan lost 97 tanks (including 32 tanks bogged down and captured in running condition) as against Indian losses of 5 tanks. According to Riza (1984), 24 Indian tanks were destroyed between 6th and 10th September, which appears to be a more realistic estimate. 

 Sialkot Sector 

In the Sialkot sector Pakistan’s 15 Division, consisting of four infantry brigades (24,101,104, and 115) and 6 Armoured Division, faced Indian I Corps, comprising 1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division, 14 Division, and 26 Division. Pakistan’s 6 Armoured Division was essentially the 100 Independent Armoured Brigade re-designated as an armoured division. It was not a full-strength division. In this sector, the Indian Army enjoyed 3:1 superiority against the Pakistan Army. 

The Indian I Corps aimed to attack the approach along the axis Ramnagar –Phillora –Chawinda – MR Link with 1 Armoured Division to cut off Grand Trunk Road north of Gujranwala and create a wedge between Lahore and Sialkot. For 1 Armoured Division’s breakout, the bridgehead, extending to line BhagowalPhillorah, was to be secured by 6 Mountain Division (presumably this mountain division was also to follow- in-  zone). The initial objective of this attack was to capture the Phillora-ChawindaPagowal areas. 

At 0600 hours, 8 September, the Indian 1 Armoured Division broke out from the bridgehead in the general area of Charwa. It was confronted by Pakistan’s 24 (infantry) Brigade minus and the under-command 25 Cavalry. Commander 24 Brigade had no idea of the quantum of the troops opposite him. Knowing little 11 about tank warfare, he asked CO 25 Cavalry to do something. The battle was a classic example of failure on both sides to appreciate the enemy’s strength. Having been clueless about the enemy he was facing; CO 25 Cavalry deployed all his three squadrons up in line abreast formation opposite the 1 Armoured Brigade leading the advance of the Indian 1 Armoured Division. This, in hindsight, was a blessing in disguise. According to the Indian accounts, PAF attacked the leading Indian armour regiments at about 0840 hours at Chobara but was unable to hit any tank. The 25 Cavalry tanks came in contact with the Indian 16 Light Cavalry tanks, without knowing they were up against the Indian 1 Armoured Division. 

In the confused firefights that followed, both sides lost tanks. the Indian 1 Armoured Brigade commander, after both his armoured regiments were held up by 25 Cavalry, and suffered losses due to the enemy and friendly fire (Indian 16 Light Cavalry and Poona Horse started firing on each other), falsely concluded that he was up against two Pakistani armoured regiments. At 1400 hours he issued orders for withdrawing the brigade into a box around Sabzpir crossroads. All this happened when there was just 25 Cavalry in front of the Indian 1 Armoured Division. 

Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu (1994) wrote: 

‘The first day’s battle could not have got off to a worse start. The armoured brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter the brigade had lost more tanks than the enemy had…. The whole of 1Corps had gained a few kilometers… The worst consequence of the day’s battle was its paralyzing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next offensive move. This interval gave the Pakistanis time to move up and deploy their 6 Armoured Division with five additional armoured regiments. We lost the golden opportunity that fate offered to the 1 st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains.” 

Summing up the Indian failure, Lieutenant General Harbaksh 12 Singh, Commander 1 Corps, wrote (2012): 

“……. We faced a serious setback through faulty decisions and immature employment of armour which the enemy was not slow to exploit. From now onwards, the thrust intended to keep the enemy off balance and reeling until the final blow by sheer speed of advance turned into a slow slogging match—a series of battering-ram actions”.

 Rajasthan Sector 

During the second week of September, the Indian Army attacked and captured Gadra Post in the Rajasthan sector. The Indian move aimed at drawing the Pakistani forces to the south to relieve the pressure on the Indian Army in Punjab. In a counterattack, the Pakistan Army recaptured the Gadra post. It also captured Munabao railway station and, while progressing ahead, the Kishangarh Fort. 

The Air War 

In 1965 the PAF comprised 17 squadrons (12-16 aircraft per squadron), which included a squadron of F-104 Starfighters; eight squadrons of F-86 Sabres; two squadrons of B-57 bombers including the secret RB-57F photo-recce aircraft that flew at 70,000 feet, beyond the reach of Indian fighters and anti-aircraft weapons. The PAF imaginatively used its two squadrons of light trainers for reconnaissance and ground attack. The IAF, in contrast, had 48 squadrons, almost thrice the PAF’s strength, although six Vampire and three Toofani fighter squadrons were obsolescent. Furthermore, India retained many squadrons in the east to guard against China. With Indian quantity offset by PAF quality, the decks were evenly stacked. 

At 1530 hours, 1 September 1965, the Number 3 Squadron of the IAF operating the French Dassault Mystere fighter jets was asked to prepare a strike in the Chamb sector, where the Pakistan Army had intruded into Indian territory. 13 Twenty-six fighter bombers of the IAF consisting of 12 Britishmade Vampire aircraft of Number 45 and 220 Squadrons and 14 Mystere aircraft of Number 3 and 31 Squadrons took off from Pathankot for the Chamb Sector. The newly acquired MiG-21s of the IAF provided air cover to the fighters carrying out raids in the next few days. Just before 1800 hours, the first IAF aircraft struck the Pakistani Patton Tanks. The IAF claimed to have destroyed 10 tanks, 2 Anti-Aircraft guns, and 30-40 vehicles of the Pakistani Army. 

On 6 September 1965, PAF launched its first major airattacks into India. Ranging freely across the border, PAF fighters attacked multiple Indian Air Force (IAF) bases, destroying (according to Indian accounts) ten Indian fighters on the ground in Pathankot, damaging another three, and downing two IAF fighters protecting Halwara air base. The next day, another 12 Indian fighters were destroyed on the ground in Kalaikunda air base, in West Bengal. The IAF remained on the back foot forthe rest of the 1965 war (Sharma, 2024). On the same day, i.e. September 6, 1965, the Indian fighter jets carried out strikes in Chamb (on the Indian side) and Narowal area (on the Pakistani side) with “no enemy air opposition!” a tongue-in-cheek entry in the 3 Squadron diary from September 6, 1965 read. 

Again, on the same day, PAF’s Sabres entered the Indian airspace and hit the Pathankot airfield. This strike resulted in the destruction of eight IAF aircraft on the ground at Pathankot. The Sabres were heading towards Adampur and Halwara airbase but were stopped by the IAF’s Hawker Hunter fighter jets. The day also saw the first showdown between the Indian MiG 21s and Pakistani Starfighter 104s. The IAF pilot in MiG-21 fired air-to-air missiles in actual combat. While the PAF’s Pathankot raid was a success, given the odds in its favour, the failure of the Adampur and Halwara air strikes did not go well with the PAF. Raids on Amritsar, Porbandar, and Ferozepur radars failed, as did the raid on Jamnagar airfield.  As reported by Singh and Rikhye (1991), on 6 September PAF No. 19 Squadron prevented the Indian 15 Division’s leading brigade from establishing a bridgehead across the BRB Canal, delaying the Indian advance and allowing Pakistan’s 10 Division to occupy forward positions in the face of the enemy onslaught. According to the same authors, other PAF missions, that deserve special mention were: 1) PAF’s successful defence of Sargodha on 7 th September; 2) No. 14 Squadron’s attacks on Kalaikunda on 7th September, destroying numerous Canberras lined up on the tarmac; 3) No.19 Squadron’s raid on Pathankot in which IAF MiG 21’s, Gnats, and Mysteres were caught off guard on the ground; 4) No. 4 Squadron’s ill-fated strike over Halwara 6th September which ended in the loss of Squadron Leader Rafiqui but had far reaching consequences. After 6 September, both the PAF and IAF  stopped all daylight bombing missions into enemy territory.

During the 1965 War, PAF modified its C-130 cargo aircraft and employed them as bombers to raid the IAF airfields. The other important mission carried out by the PAF ‘s C-130 fleet was to insert para commandos by C-130B to cripple three frontline airbases of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Punjab – Pathankot, Halwara (near Ludhiana) and Adampur (near Jalandhar). On 6 September, the PAF’s raid on Pathankot airbase inflicted large damage. The IAF had also suffered an early setback over Chamb and had lost four Vampires. This left the IAF in disarray. Till 6 September, the lack of significant activities on PAF’s side was intriguing the IAF. However, it was just a lull before the PAF put its most audacious plan into action. The Pakistanis dropped paratroopers at Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara in the intervening night of 6-7 September. Three PAF C-130 aircraft dropped 60 Special Service Group Commandos each in the early hours. The three groups of 60 paratroopers each were dropped in the vicinity of each airbase. An officer and a junior commissioned 15 officer (JCO) led each group. The drop was successful, but the Pakistan commandos ran into unforeseen difficulties. A concerted effort by civilians and the Indian Punjab Police resulted in the apprehension of most of the Commandos. Villagers spotted the Pathankot group first, and an alarm was raised. This led to the discovery of the Halwara group. The Adampur group also landed in the middle of the village, and the dogs’ barking gave away their presence. 

In the end, of the 180 para-commandos air-inserted, 138 were taken prisoners and taken to POW camps. Twenty-two were lynched by the joint combing teams of villagers armed with sticks and police. Only 20 para commandos were unaccounted for and were thought to have escaped back to Pakistan. One notable, commando-style escape was of Major Hazur Hasnain, the Halwara group commander who, along with his friend, hijacked an IAF jeep and somehow managed to return safely. According to PAF  officer Kaiser Tufail’s account, operational considerations for the SSG’s employment were: 

“The operations would be mounted in the early hours of the night. Air missions (para-commandos) would be dropped on the target. Exfiltration would be either by landing an aircraft on the captured airfield or by rendezvous with a helicopter, given the vast distances separating the targets from friendly forces.” 

Individual commandos were provided with two days’ rations (five sweet rotis each) and 400 rupees in Indian currency, in addition to personal weapons, explosives, grenades, etc. The Pakistan Army officers were retired  for opposing the use of the World War II tactic of utilizing “commandos in insurgency and prolonged guerrilla warfare roles that were central to the impending Operation ‘Gibraltar.

Tufail opined about the ill-planned mission:

 “The AHQ (Army Headquarters) had also left several issues unresolved during the planning stage. For instance, the idea of exfiltration of commandos by C-130s landing on the just assaulted airfields 16 defied common sense, but either the PAF C-in-C remained unaware of this plan or had rashly approved it.” (Sharma, 2024).

 C-130 Bombers Modified 

Sharma (2024) further writes: 

As the war proceeded, the Pakistan Air Force modified the C130s to drop bombs. C-130 bombers targeted Indian tanks and guns in Ramgarh of the Sialkot sector. As part of its riposte strategy, the Indian Army had made advances in the Sialkot sector in response to Pakistan’s advent in Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, Indian tanks advanced in the Chawinda region. Both areas resulted in two of the biggest tank battles in the history of the Indian subcontinent. Two C-130s PAF came out in support of their forces and dropped nine tons of bombs each on the night of 15 September. On the following night, a single C-130 strike was repeated against Ramgarh, destroying Indian tanks and guns as well as ammunition and fuel dumps. Seven officers of the Transport Wing were awarded the Sitara-eJurat, and 2 JCOSs the Tamgha-e-Jurat. Some estimates suggest that the IAF flew over 4,000 combat sorties and the PAF a little over 2,000. The Indian account of the 1965 war claimed that the IAF lost 36 aircraft while still parked on the ground. On the other hand, in aerial dogfights, the IAF claimed having lost just 14 aircraft while shooting down 18 Pakistani jet fighters. Pakistan ended the war, having depleted 17 percent of its frontine strength, while India’s losses amounted to less than 10 percent. 

 PN raid on Dwarka 

The only significant naval operation during the war was the Pakistan Navy’s Dwarka raid , 200 miles east of Karachi. The Indian Navy’s throwing down the Pakistani challenge when at least one Indian frigate, INS Talwar, was in the vicinity, was enigmatic and the excuse that the Indian government had restrained its navy from operating west of Porbandar is superfluous. A more valid explanation of the Indian Navy’s mute response to the Dwarka raid may be the threat posed by the Pakistani submarine Ghazi due to which most of the Indian Navy’s western fleet, including the aircraft carrier Vikrant, was bottled up in Bombay port, ostensibly for retrofitting. This brings out an important conclusionthat an aircraft carrier, without a potent onboard air complement, instead ofprojecting sea power, is a sitting duck. Unlike the Pakistanis, the Indian military leaders are over-cautious and do not take the plunge unless they are 100% sure of their success. The Indian Navy was not confident about the capabilities of Sea Hawk ground attack aircraft and Breguet Alize ASW aircraft on board Vikrant. Had the Indian Navy taken the risk, the Sea Hawk and Alize duo could have reduced the Pakistan Navy’s Sea denial and limited sea control capabilities. After all, Sea Hawk had performed well during the Suez Crisis. Sea Hawk was sub-sonic,but so was Sabre, PAF’s workhorse during the 65 and 71 wars. 

Analysis 

The Mindset 

The limited war scenario, as fancied by the Foreign Office, some generals, Ayub Khan, and his army chief (in that order), proved wishful thinking. If they were intent on a military solution, the operational strategy should have hinged upon fostering, incubating, and abetting an insurgency in the Valley for at least one year. We should have fully expected a backlash by 18 India and, to counter it, maintained a defensive posture all along the CFL, the Working Boundary, and the international boundary while holding the strategic defensive balance with 1 Armoured Division, 6 Armoured Division, and 9 Division. Talking to a Pakistani military delegation that had gone to China with a wish list of weapons and ammunition, PM Chou En Lai remarked that he was not clear on what basis the quantity of ammunition had been calculated. One of the Pakistani generals replied that these were based on t h e fourteen-day general service reserves, which prompted Chou EnLai to ask what would happen after fourteen days. Would Pakistan achieve its military objectives in fourteen days of fighting with India? The general replied that Pakistan hoped that, during that time, the Security Councilwould meet and call upon both countries to cease fire and withdraw armed forces to their respective borders. Astonished by the reply, Chou snapped back that if the outcome of a conflict has been predetermined to be a restoration of the status quo ante, then why fight at all? Why unnecessarily waste human lives and economic resources? Wars cannot be fought according to a timetable, and one has to be ready for a prolonged conflict. There was no reply from the Pakistani side. “As your friend”, Chou continued, “I would be interested to know if you have prepared the people of Pakistan to operate in the rear of the enemy, in the event of your first line of defence is broken, to cut the enemy’s lines of communications, disrupt his supplies and generally inflict damage. I am talking about a people’s militia being based in every village and town. Since Pakistan lacks an industrial base to replenish supplies, this type of defence is suited to its needs.” 

*A popular army, based on universal conscription, is an attractive idea. Besides the former socialist countries,which called it “people’s army”, conscription is adopted by countries having a shortage of manpower, particularly Israel and Switzerland. However, fighting a “people's war” by involving the citizenry, requires a very high degree ofmotivation through an equally strong and inspiring leadership. China, Vietnam, and Israel fought successful wars with popular armies. Peoples War is a misnomer in the Subcontinent because the political systems in vogue do not generate the national unity and motivation necessary for such a war. Besides, there is a misconception that a citizens’ army is more economical than a conventional army. On the contrary, it is more expensive because, in an emergency, the armed forces have to be mobilized. The cost of mobilization is prohibitive. 

Aims & Objectives 

The Indians claim that9⁸ during the 1965 War they stopped short of Lahore because, by their admission, they did not want to get embroiled with Pakistan Army and para-military forces in the city and its environs. But then you do not attack with a superior force, yet avoid suffering casualties.General Chaudhuri claimed that during the war the Indian Army aimed to destroy Pakistan’s war machine instead of capturing territory. We know that Chaudhuri was giving a lame excuse because it required superiority in the air, armour, and artillery to destroy enemy forces and equipment. IAF possessed more aircraft than PAF but failed to translate this superiority in the air. It was because, according to Shukla (2014), PAF’s qualitative edge and superior training evenly matched IAF’s numerical superiority. Indian armour was quantitatively and, to some extent, qualitatively inferior to Pakistani armour, and during the war only Pakistan had 155 mm heavy artillery. Yes, India had more infantry formations and we know that infantry is essentially employed not to destroy the enemy but to capture and hold ground. The Indians always come up with the excuse that, had the 1965 war been allowed to prolong for, say, another two weeks, the Pakistan Army would have been defeated. They give the same excuse in the case of the first Kashmir war. That both these wars ended in a stalemate was not due to India’s magnanimity or improper appreciation by their civil and military leadership. Nor were they pressured by the external powers. It was because, like  Pakistan, their military machine had also lost its steam. Shastri had asked General Chaudhuri if he could continue the war for some more time. It was Chaudhuri, who buckled. In the Chenab and Ravi-Sutlej corridors, the three weeks of fighting resulted in a stalemate. Pakistan had made a shallow penetration in the Kasur sector, whereas the Indians had made gains in the Sialkot sector. In both these sectors, the new defensive lines were not based on any formidable obstacle – fighting stopped when both sides were exhausted. If we go by the logic that the Indian juggernaut, due to its sheer weight, would have rolled down the numerically inferior Pakistani forces in due course, this was not evident during those three weeks of fighting. Advancing through the Ravi-Chenab corridor, the Indians could not even contact the Grand Trunk Road. And this happened when thePakistan Army stumbled into the war without serious preparation. 

Planning & Preparation 

It seems Pakistan’s military planners were in an undue hurry to wage a war in Kashmir. They were confusing commando operations with guerrilla warfare. Had they given at least a year for incubating and maturing the insurgency in J&K through the creation of sleeper cells, tied up the loose ends by not succumbing to bleeding 12 Division for cobbling together the infiltration force, and factoredIndia’s likely response along the international border, better results could have been achieved. Pakistan might not have recovered the whole of Indian- held Kashmir, but the offensive in Chamb would not have faltered the way itdid. Ayub Khan played a gamble in which he miserably lost. The strategy would not be effective without creating a light but effective command infrastructure and logistics support network in the Valley. Combined teams comprising the locals, irregulars, and the Army, divided into small groups should have been created. Each team would be self-sufficient and armed with small arms, rocket launchers, and heavy mortars, with further supplies hidden in the forests, tunnels, andmountain crevices. Such teams 21 would have unrestrained freedom of action, facilitating quicker (relative to mountainous terrain) regrouping and response rates. By the end of the three weeks of fighting, both sides were short of ammunition. Pakistan was in worse shape because it started with only two weeks of general service reserves. However, Chinese small arms and ammunition had started coming in by air. Heavy arms and artillery ammunition were being shipped. Coming back to their dependence on borrowed power, once they bungled up on the battlefield due to their naiveté and ineptitude, the Pakistani leaders started blaming the US for clamping an arms embargo. They should not have waged the war if they were not confident of concluding it within the resources available. And then, the familiar ritual of raving and ranting before the Wailing Wall of the United Nations. 

Force Ratios 

The United States made certain that its military assistance to Pakistan did not tilt the balance against India. In 1965, on the western border,Pakistan had seven infantry divisions (The 14 Division was in East Pakistan) andtwo armoured divisions. India had twelve infantry divisions and one armoured division. However, India also had the advantage of pulling out three divisions (4 Mountain, 6Mountain, and 23 Mountain) from the China front to beef up the XI Corps and I Corps respectively. So actually, there were 15 x Indian infantry divisions arrayed against Pakistan’s seven infantry divisions, a force ratio of 2.1:1. Northern Area Scouts were responsible for defending the area from Point NJ9842 in the extreme north to excluding Neelum Valley. They were supposed to fend for themselves, without heavy weapons and artillery support. The Indian Army exploited Pakistan’s weakness in this sector and captured the commanding heights overlooking Kargil. From Neelum Valley inclusive in the north to Munawar down south, the area was held by Azad Kashmir Regular Forces under 12 Division. AK units were a bottom priority in scales and quality of equipment. In map exercises, during peacetime, the 22 paramilitary forces and police were equated with regular troops. In deployment along the Cease Fire Line (CFL), there was an unhealthy mixtureof regular and non-regular elements, down to platoon and sectionlevels. 15 Division, 10 Division, 11 Division, and 8 Division were the holding formations defending the Sialkot, Lahore, Kasur, and Sindh sectors respectively. Before India attacked along the international border, the 7 Division was already committed to Operation Grand Slam. What was left as strategic defensive balance? The two armoured divisions and the 9 Division. Since an Indian response across the international border was not considered, the strategic reserves had to be committed prematurely. There should have been one infantry division following in zone each armoured division. Then there was a serious deficiency in the command organization. While 11 Division and 1 Armoured Division were operating side by side, there was no corps HQ to control the operations of the two divisions. Even then, it was not an impossible option if Pakistan’s decision makers hadwanted to solve the Kashmir problem militarily. As mentioned earlier, there were 15x Indian infantry divisions arrayed against Pakistan’s seven infantry divisions, a force ratio of 2.1:1 in India’s favour. However, let us not be misled by bland statistics. Pakistan possessed a superiority of 1.41 in combat power to India’s 1 in the Kasur sector, but its 1 Armoured division was defeated. On the other hand, India had 3:1 superiority in combat power in the Sialkot sector. However, the Indian offensive in this sector failed to achieve its objectives. Army leadership in both countries did not know how to exploit their respective superiority in armour and infantry. The offensive at Chamb did not fritter away so much due to a change in command than the fact that the 7 Division had to be diverted when the Indian XI Corps attacked Lahore and Sialkot. 

Employment of Armour 

 It is difficult to calculate the force ratio between armour, mainly because of the disparity in the quality of tanks. The Centurion’s advantage lay in its superior firepower and armour protection compared with the M47 and M48 Patton tanks. The Patton's armour could be penetrated by the 75 mm gun of the AMX-13.In firepower, the Patton was inferior to the Centurion, though superior to the Sherman. However, the Patton had greater mobility and was easier tomaintain. The M48 version had better hull armour than early models of the Centurion. Centurion’s turret-stow bins gave additional protection against infantry handheld anti-tank weapons (Zaloga, 1999). In discussions, Indian defence analysts point out Patton’s advantage in night fighting capability due to infrared devices. The Americans removed these devices before the tanks were shipped to Pakistan. The Centurion was not to be shrugged off. Israelis had fought the 1967 and 1973 wars with this tank and prevailed. While developing the Merkava, Israel’s main battle tank, many features of the Centurion, particularly its suspension system,were retained. Both sides held Patton in reasonably high esteem. Poor tactics were to blame for the debacle at Asal Uttar. AMX-13, Sherman, and Chafeealmost had the same characteristics in the category of light tanks equipping the recce regiments, though AMX-13 was sleek and looked like a sports version of tanks. 

Sam Manekshaw’s Controversy 

Gauhar Ayub, son of former President Ayub Khan, claimed many years after his father’s death that an Indian army officer who later rose to the highest military rank had sold the country's battle plans to Pakistan in the 1950s. In an interview with a television channel, Gohar Ayub Khan, former Pakistan foreign minister, said his father had told him that an Indian brigadier who was the Director of Military Operations in the 1950s had sold battle plans to his country. Gohar Ayub refused to name the person but said he was from the first batch of the Indian Military Academy, commissioned in the  4th Battalion of the 12 Frontier Force, wounded in the Burma campaign in 1942 for which he was awarded the Military Cross and rose to the highest possible rank in the Indian army. When told that his description fitted former Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who was then admitted to the military hospital in Coonoor, the former Pakistani minister said, "I would not name him, the individual. You possibly can fill the gap from what you have heard." When told that he has dropped a bombshell, implicating one of the highly decorated Indian heroes, Gohar Ayub repeated "I am not naming the gentleman." 

The remarks evoked immediate condemnation from two former Generals -- former Army Chief Gen Shankar Roy Chowdhry and Bangladesh war hero Lt Gen J F R Jacob -- who described the remarks as "scurrilous, malicious and nonsense". "I disbelieve it," Gen Roy Chowdhry said over the telephone from Kolkata. "In any case, to make allegations after such a long time you need solid proof. Not anybody's diaries or comments. If they had the battle plans, they should have won the 1965 war. They lost the Haji Pir pass, which was a body blow," the former army chief said. General Jacob said that he had known Manekshaw since the 1950s and there was no way at all, whatsoever, that Sam Manekshaw could have sold secrets to Pakistan. "He is an honourable man and these allegations by Ayub Khan are abusive, malicious, and complete nonsense. Sam Manekshaw is a distinguished, honourable man and was responsible as Army Chief for India's greatest victory over Pakistan in 1971.”He is upright and is loyal to the country," Jacob said. 

 

Major Conclusions 

1. In 1965, Bhutto managed to take President Ayub Khan for a ride by deceiving him that sending infiltrators to IHK would not result in India attacking Pakistan across the international border. Bhutto was privy to the fact that India and Pakistan lacked the conventional military punch to knock out each other. He appreciated that an all-out war between India and Pakistan would result in a political and military stalemate that would weaken Ayub Khan and pave the way for Bhutto’s entry into the corridors of power. 

2. The perceived victory in Rann of Kutch made t h e P a k i s t a n A r m y draw t h e wrong conclusion that the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military move in Jammu & Kashmir even as it had failed to counter the Chinese onslaught in 1962 and that Kashmir was ripe for a popular uprising. 

3. Ayub Khan also mistakenly concluded that America would come to Pakistan’s assistance, even when the latter provoked a war with India. 

4. The Rann of Kutch conflict was followed by Operation Gibraltar where Pakistan tried to unfreeze the deadlock in Jammu &Kashmir by repeating its past approach of sending infiltrators into the disputed state. Breaking the inertia was the main motive for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 65 War. 

 5. Operation Gibraltar was a parody of Guerrilla warfare. It was planned on the faulty assumption that sending infiltrators into IHK would not result in India attacking Pakistan across the international border. The infiltration force was pushed into the Indian-held Kashmir after four to six weeks of training, no ideological motivation, and woefully inadequate logistics. 

6. India had more infantry divisions while Pakistan had numerical and (near) technical superiority in armour. However, both India and Pakistan failed to exploit their respective advantages. 

7. Both the armies displayed faulty reading of the battle resulting in immature employment of armour – Pakistan Army in the Kasur Sector, and the Indian Army in the Sialkot Sector. In the Kasur Sector, Pakistan Army launched the 1 Armoured Division despite the terrain being unfit for armour operations due to poor trafficability and restricted fields of fire. The Indians used the terrain better by following a defensive posture in this sector. In Sialkot Sector, where the terrain had better armour trafficability, the Indian armour commanders failed to appreciate the tactical  picture. They blundered into believing that, despite their numerical superiority, they were up against a Pakistani armoured division. 

8. The three weeks of fighting had resulted in a stalemate in both Ravi – Chenab and Ravi-Sutlej corridors. Pakistan had made a shallow penetration in the Kasur sector, whereas the Indians had made gains in the Sialkot sector. The Indian Army could not negotiate the BRB Canal, which was not a formidable obstacle. 

 9. IAF possessed more aircraft than PAF but failed to translate this superiority in the air. It was because, according to Shukla (2014), PAF’s qualitative edge and superior training evenly matched IAF’s numerical superiority. 

10. The Pakistan Navy raid on Dwarka was more of a symbolic nature. However, it was significant that the smaller Pakistan Navy challenged its more powerful rival and demonstrated its sea control ability, at least in the Arabian Sea. 

 Saleem Akhtar Malik 

6 September 2024

 REFERENCES 

1. Ali, L.A. (2009). The Rann of Kutch and its aftermath. South Asian Studies Vol. 24,No.2. 

2. Amin, A.H. (2000). Grand Slam- A battle of lost opportunities. Retrieved fromwww.defencereview.com. 

3. Chakravorty, B. (2014). Battle of Asal Uttar: 1965 Indo-Pak War. Scholar Warrior. Retrieved from www.claws.in/. 

4. Gauhar, A. (1993). Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler. Sangemeel Publications. 

5. Gill, J.H. (2004). Dissuasion and Confrontation: U.S. Policy in India – Pakistan Crises.Strategic Insights. Vol.3, Issue 2. 

6. Hali, S.M. (2012). Operation Gibraltar: An unmitigated disaster? RetrievedFrom www.criterionquarterly.com. 

7. Khan, N.A. (2012). Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan (Comparative Feminist Studies). Palgrave-Macmillan. 

8.Khan, S.A. (2015). 1965. The old-time great memories of the battle of Chawinda. Retrievedfrom www.pakmade.info. 

9.Khan, S.M. (2006). Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat. Paramount Books(Pvt) Ltd. 27 

10. Rikhye, R. (1988). The War That Never Was. Chanakya Publications.12 Riza, S. (1984). Pakistan Army War 1965. Services Book Club. 

11. Sandhu, G.S. (1994). The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971. Vision Books. 

12. Singh, P. & Rikhye, R. (1991). Fiza'ya: Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force. Society forAerospace Studies. 

13. Singh, H. (2012). War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965. Lancer Publishers. 

14. Sharma, R. (2024). C-130’s Havoc! How Pakistan’s ‘Modified Bomber’ Wreaked Havoc On Indian Positions After A ‘Disastrous’ Paradrop. Eurasian Times. 

15. Shukla, A. (2014). The day nothing happened. Retrieved from www.businessstandard.com. 

16. Shukla, A. (2016). Missile test an urgent step towards defending IAF bases. Retrieved fromwww.business standard.com. 

17.Zaloga, S.J. (1999). The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks. Osprey Publications.