How the Israel -Hamas War is changing the art of warfare!
Hamas launched a large-scale scale operation against Israel early in the morning of 7 October 2023. The attack started with a rocket barrage, followed by a swift land, air, and sea invasion through foot soldiers, ultralight aircraft, paragliders, and landing craft. The militant groups forced their way through Gaza border crossings after bulldozing the barrier that separates the 140 square kilometer Gaza strip from Israel. They entered the Israeli settlements and military installations, surrounding civilian communities, and the military bases, taking the settlers and military personnel by surprise.
Benjamin
Netanyahu initially vowed to decimate Hamas and hinted at expelling the entire
Palestinian population from Gaza. In his eagerness to upstage Netanyahu, Biden
urged that destroying Hamas was Israel’s duty. Biden’s harangue was targeted at
the Democratic Party’s voters – US elections are scheduled in 2024.
However, Netanyahu’s initial cockiness was diluted when
he realized the impracticability of his ambition. Perhaps the consequences of
the 1982 IDF siege of Beirut forewarned Netanyahu that his ambition would lead
the IDF into a viper’s nest in Gaza. Netanyahu now talks about only expelling
Hamas from Gaza, and Biden meekly seconds him. The thrust of Israel, backed by
the US and the EU, is to somehow persuade Egypt and Jordan to accept the Hamas
into their territories. Both these countries have refused.
The
state of Israel was proclaimed in May 1948 and was immediately attacked by armies of its Arab neighbors. Except for Trans- Jordan which had a British-trained army, the
armies of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were no match for the better-trained Israeli
paramilitary outfits - Haganah and Stern Gang.
These Jewish settler- outfits were thus able to defeat the Arab armies on the
Egyptian and Syrian fronts, and the Iraqi and Saudi army contingents which had
invaded the British-mandated Palestine on the outbreak of war. Only the Jordanian
Army, under Glubb Pasha, its British commander, could take on the Jews and occupy the West Bank of the river Jordan and East Jerusalem.
Looking back, one finds that Israel defeated the regular Arab armies in
the 1948 and 1967 wars, but could not as effectively confront the militant groups
like PLO, Hezbollah, and Hamas that arose out of the ashes of the 67 and 73
Wars. In 1967 the IDF defeated the combined Arab armies through sheer force of armour and
air power. In 1973, the impact of the Israeli shock effect was somehow diluted
when IDF, for the first time, confronted the Egyptian soldier with his
hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The 1973 War was a strategic defeat for Israel because
consequently, Israel had to vacate the Sinai Peninsula, Sharm el Sheikh, and
part of Golan Heights.
In 1982, IDF came
across the PLO fighter who employed the same weapons and tactics as were used
by the Egyptian Army during the 1973 War. The invincibility of IDF was cracked. The Israeli siege of Beirut had begun on 14 June
1982 after IDF completed the encirclement of the city the previous day. The
Israelis chose to keep the city under siege rather than forcibly capture it, as
they were unwilling to accept the heavy casualties that the heavy street
fighting required to capture the city would have resulted in.
Israeli forces bombarded targets within Beirut from land, sea, and air,
and attempted to assassinate Palestinian leaders through airstrikes. The
Israeli Navy maintained a blockade on the port of Beirut with a ring of
missile boats and patrol boats supported by submarines. PLO was expelled from
Beirut through a UN-brokered deal. It then re-established itself in Tunis. Though PLO had to leave Beirut, it was the
first time after the 73 War that DF had suffered heavy casualties, this time at
the hands of an Arab militia (that’s what PLO was), not a regular Arab Army.
After PLO’s expulsion from Beirut, Hezbollah, a Shia militant
organization backed by Iran, rose in Lebanon. In 2006, Hezbollah fought the Second Lebanon War with Israel. Hamas is a Sunni
Islamist political and military organization created in the Gaza Strip in 1987,
While Hamas is headquartered in Gaza City, it also has a presence in the West
Bank where its secular rival, the Palestinian Authority, exercises control.
Since 2005, Hamas has built an underground city beneath Gaza.
It is a vast network of tunnels used for bypassing the Israeli blockade on
movement of eatables and utility items into Gaza, and for fighting the Israeli
occupation. The underground tunnel network allows Hamas and
other militant groups to store and shield weapons, gather and move
underground, communicate, train, launch offensive attacks, transport hostages,
and retreat without being detected by Israeli or Egyptian authorities. This
network of tunnels is colloquially referred to as the Gaza Metro.
The tunnel system runs beneath many Gazan towns and cities,
such as Khan Yunis, Jabalia, and the Shati refugee
camp. Typically, tunnel access points are hidden inside buildings, such as
private homes or mosques, or camouflaged by brush, which impedes their
detection via aerial imaging or drones.
access points and routes, starting in several homes or chicken coops,
joining together into a main route, and then branching off again into several
separate passages leading into buildings on the other side.
According to the BBC
News:
The
cross-border tunnels tend to be rudimentary, meaning they have barely any
fortification. They are dug for a one-time purpose - invading Israeli
territory. The tunnels inside Gaza are different because Hamas is using them
regularly. They are constructed for prolonged warfare and equipped for a
longer, sustained presence. The Hamas leadership uses the permanent
infrastructure as command-and-control centres. They are equipped with
electricity, lighting, and rail tracks.
Palestinian and Lebanese militant outfits are taking on the
Israeli juggernaut and bleeding it where the mighty Arab armies failed during
the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars. The Hamas-Israel and Hezbollah-Israel
conflicts are not characterized by armoured columns sweeping through the Middle
East deserts. Instead, the world is
increasingly swarmed with media footage showing masked Arab gunmen, holding
RPG-7 confronting Israeli tanks and APCs.
These militant outfits are supported by Iran and many Islamist
organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. They fight with a
cocktail of weapons built by
Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea. Hezbollah and Hamas are both trained like
professional armies. Their arsenals are comprised mostly of small,
man-portable, and unguided surface-to-surface artillery rockets. Although these
devices lack precision, their sheer number makes them effective weapons of
terror. The rockets are made from water pipes stuffed with a mixture of sugar and potassium nitrate, an oxidizing agent. The
quality and accuracy of the mixing and curing process can produce a propellant
capable of reaching a specific impulse for a workable rocket.
The IDF's predicament against Hezbollah
and Hamas is mirrored in what happened between the Soviet Army and the Afghan Mujahideen
almost half a century ago. In a set-piece Soviet attack, the Mujahideen
localities were pounded by fire from gunship
helicopters and artillery. ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns mounted on medium trucks would engage and try to flush out
the guerrillas holding the heights.
Thence,
the Soviet armour, closely followed by mechanized infantry, attacked and
swept across the area, firing with
all their weapons. Rarely did the mechanized infantry dismount and pursue the enemy into their hideouts where the
tanks and IFVs could not go. This
happened during the Panjshir offensive and was replicated elsewhere. Resultantly, when the Soviet troops
withdrew after a battle, the rebels came out of their sanctuaries and reorganised for fresh attacks.
Like
the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israeli
armoured formations were ineffective
against small guerrilla groups which used hit-and-run tactics and did not present a tangible target to the enemy.
In the heavily built-up areas of Beirut and Gaza, armour protection and firepower
gave a false sense of security to the Israeli tank crews and infantrymen cloistered inside the APCs/IFVs. In urban
warfare, armour and mechanized infantry are of little value unless
the infantry dismounts, runs through
the minefield, attacks
the defender, and overcomes the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. This is what some of the armies
trained in mechanized warfare are averse to.
Saleem Akhtar Malik
17 March 2024
The author is a Pakistan Army veteran who regularly writes on national and international affairs, defense, military history, and military technology. His talks on these subjects are aired on his YouTube Channel "The Observation Post". His blog "Sam1953.blogspot.com" features his articles. Tweets @saleemakhtar53.

Comments
Post a Comment