A Short history of the 1965 War

The first Kashmir war did not end in a decisive solution for either of the contestants. Pakistanis felt frustrated and bitter while their leadership tried to hide behind the United Nations resolutions and similar excuses. On the other hand, Nehru, the man who had promoted himself as a person, symbolizing India, was generally content with what India had grabbed. For now, he appeared sated like a cat after it has polished off the mouse. For him, Pakistan held Kashmir could wait for another day. The Indian leadership, however, occasionally made noises about recovering the chunks of Kashmir India had lost to Pakistan. 

Breaking the inertia was the main motive for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 65 War. There are many theories about the causes of this war. The boilerplate explanation by the Pakistani leadership is the refusal by India to grant the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris. According to the proponents of this theory the Valley was simmering with unrest due to the inept Kashmiri leadership, high-handedness of the occupation administration, and perhaps because Indian leadership was contemplating on withdrawing the special status accorded to the state under the Indian constitution. According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India. Some Pakistani theorists point out to the growing frustration and resentment when the people started getting fed up with Ayub Khan, particularly after his controversial success in the 1964 general elections. Ayub Khan was losing his grip on power as new power centres were emerging (Bhutto, the army itself, and Bengali autonomists). During the twilight years of his rule (1964-68) Ayub Khan did not entirely control the decision- making process in Pakistan. 

Whatever the reason, Ayub Khan, unwittingly or in cohort with at least two power centres (Bhutto and some of the generals) took steps to break the inertia. There should be nothing to apologize about this and start a blame game. However, Ayub started a war without proper planning and with faulty appreciation. Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.

Escalation 

Rann of Kutch, comprising an area of 30,000 square kilometers, is a seasonal salt marshland located between the Indian state of Gujarat and the southern tip of Pakistan’s Sindh province. Due to its marshy nature the area was not regularly patrolled on the Pakistani side. In 1951,Sind Police Rangers (Later renamed Indus Rangers)established a few posts along a track approximately 15 kilometers south of track Rahimki Bazaar - Nohar Varo-Nagar Parkar (the so- called CustomsTrack). In 1953, in pursuit of economy of force  even these posts were abandoned and the Rangers withdrew to the Customs Track. Indians were quick to encroach and establish their claim. On night 24^th /25^th February, 1953 a company of Indian Reserve Police (predecessor to the Border Security Force) occupied Chadd Bed, a strip of semi-marshland located on Pakistan’s side of the northern Rann. Customary noises were raised by the Pakistani mandarins while the leaders on both the sides tried to discuss the dispute (Nehru- Noon, 1958; Lt Gen Sheikh-Swaran Singh, 1960). Thereafter there was a long period of hibernation. In January 1965 the Indians woke up from their slumber, reinforced the area with approximately two BSF battalions, and their patrols started probing forward towards the Rangers posts located along the Customs Track. 

There were accusations and counter accusations by both the sides about border violations. These were followed by attacks on each other's posts. Pakistanis blamed Indians of establishing new posts on their side of the border, particularly the Sardar Post which was established in March 1965 on a high ground located to the south-west of Rahimki Bazaar. The ensuing skirmishes remained localized and, harking back to the era of the limited wars, the two air chiefs agreed on keeping their respective air forces out of the conflict. Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border. This was hailed as a great victory for Pakistan. Emboldened by the setback to the Indians, Major General Tikka Khan, GOC 8 Division, outlined a tactical plan called Plan Alpha to capture the northern half of the Rann. However, Ayub Khan did not allow such an offensive. Ayub Khan’s critics think he had missed an opportunity to push India further to the south (Ali, 2009; Gauhar, 1993). 

In June of 1965, at the behest of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, both countries agreed to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The clash had not resulted in a major gain for Pakistan. When the tribunal announced its award in 1968, Pakistan was awarded, against its claim of 9,100 square kilometers (3,500 square miles), approximately a marginal area of 910 square kilometers (350 square miles) to the south and east of Rahimki Bazaar including Chadd Bed. Indian claim on the whole of the Rann was rejected. The international boundary in this area was thus roughly delineated along the line that existed in 1953.

For Ayub Khan the outcome of Rann of Kutch encounter was a victory for the Pakistan Army. This perceived victory made him draw wrong conclusions that the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military move in Jammu & Kashmir even as it had failed to counter the Chinese onslaught in 1962. He was mistaken that the situation in the Indian-held Kashmir was ripe for a popular uprising. Ayub Khan also mistakenly concluded that America would come to Pakistan’s assistance, even when the latter provoked a war with India. It is surprising how he failed to register U.S. ambassador Walter Mc Conaughy’s stern warning to Pakistan against using U.S. arms in a conflict with India (Gill, 2004).

OperationGibraltar

The original plan for the operation code-named Gibraltar may have been prepared by the Pakistan Army as early as the 1950s, but, according to the folklore, was resurrected by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC 12 Division. During a meeting held in late May 1965 on the directive of Vice Chief of the General Staff (Major General Abid Bilgrami), General Akhtar revealed his plan to Colonel Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, Commander Special Services Group (SSG). The plan called for infiltrating groups of “Mujahideen” comprising regular army troops and irregulars into IHK for contriving a local uprising and unfreezing the issue without provoking a general war (Hali,2012). It was almost going to be a replay of the first Kashmir war. As mentioned earlier, the meeting between the two was arranged by the Vice Chief of the General Staff. However, when asked by Mehdi if the Army High Command were on board, Akhtar responded that it was his plan. When asked further when he expected to launch the Mujahideen, Akhtar replied “July, the same year”. According to Mehdi, he told Akhtar that the plan was a non-starter, but upon the latter’s insistence, Mehdi left behind his three officers whom he had taken along for the meeting with Akhtar and “tasked them to do their best in the remaining four to six weeks”. 

The mission assigned to the various infiltration groups was warfare in the enemy’s rear with a view to creating conditions for an open revolt against the Indian occupation. Within the four to six weeks time frame available one can imagine what sort of training, ground work, coordination with the local Kashmiris and logistics planning would have been done. The total strength of the “Gibraltar Force” was not more than 5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into nine forces. Operation Gibraltar surprised the Kashmiris more than the Indian Army. Instead of receiving help from the locals, most of the infiltrators were handed over to the Indian Army. Those who were not discovered were in a more pathetic state since rations, ammunition and supplies ran out.

Between 25^th August and 11 ^th September Indians attacked and captured important Pakistani posts in Neelam and Jhelum valleys. It is not easy to capture a dominating feature held by a well- trained defender. Why were Pakistani defences in the area falling like nine pins? Let us try to find out by reading between the lines of the official history.

During Operation Gibraltar whole infantry battalions were pulled out from their defensive positions by bleeding the holding brigades (Sectors) to beef up the infiltration forces. Some of the units were hastily moved into the area from their peacetime locations. When the Indians retaliated by attacking Pakistani posts all along the CFL, the infiltrating units were recalled and asked to counter attack. There was little time for preparation. In the confusion of battle, companies lost contact with each other and with their battalion headquarters. This was the state of planning to liberate Kashmir.

Operation Grand Slam

 

In order to ease the pressure on 12 Division , which was defending against repeated Indian attacks, and to guard against the threat to the important city of Muzaffarabad, which resulted from the gain by Indian forces of strategic areas like the Hajipir Pass, the Pakistan Army commenced Operation Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1^st September 1965.

 

Chamb was defended by the Indian 191 Infantry Brigade Group (provisionally under command 15 Division) and a squadron of AMX-13 tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the AMX-13 tanks, though possessing the same firepower as the Pakistani M47 and M48 Patton tanks, were outnumbered in this sector. For the operation, Major General Akhtar Husain Malik had set up his headquarters at Kharian. Forces under his command were 3x infantry brigades (No. 4 Sector, 10 Brigade, and 102 Brigade), 2x armoured regiments (ex 6 Armoured Division), and Artillery I Corps (Amin, 2000). Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces retreated from their defensive positions. 

On the second day of the attack, Major General Akhtar Malik was replaced by GOC 7 Division, Major General Yahya Khan, which delayed the attack by one day. Not only did this decision cause confusion among the Pakistani officer cadre, the delay also permitted the Indians to rush reinforcements to the sector. When the attack recommenced on 3^rd September, the Indian forces in the sector were sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days, but they did not have the strength to launch a counterattack. The Pakistani attack staggered for two more days without any significant gains in territory. To relieve pressure from Chamb and Akhnoor , on night 5th /6th September India attacked Pakistan along the Radcliffe Line. The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani attack. Realizing the gravity of the threat, the Pakistani Army stopped its thrust into Kashmir and diverted 7 Division to counter the Indian incursion.

Lahore Sector

Lahore Gymkhana Club where General Jayanto Nath  Chaudhuri, the Indian ArmyChief, had vowed to drink a chota peg along with breakfast

Despite intelligence reports that had started trickling in as early as 15^th August, clearly indicating that the Indian Army had started operational build up against West Pakistan, GHQ remained in a state of limbo. Even after the capture of Chamb and advance towards Akhnur no precautionary measures were taken due to the Foreign Office assurance that India would not start an all out war. On evening 4^th September, referring to the Indian prime minister, All India Radio informed the listeners that the Pakistan Army was moving from Sialkot towards Jammu. Alarmed by the Indian fabrication, at around midnight 4^th /5 ^th September GHQ dispatched a signal to the field formations, directing them, in a vague manner, to “take necessary defensive measures”. 

At the Lahore front Indian XI Corps began its operations by advancing on three axes –15 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) was to attack Lahore along Amritsar –Lahore axis (Wagah road), 7 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) to attack Burki along Khalra –Burki axis, and 4 Mountain Division ( two mountain brigades and an armour regiment) advancing along Khem Karan- Kasur axis was to capture Kasur. 

Facing the Indians along Amritsar-Lahore and Khalra- Burki axes was 10 Division (seven infantry battalions within three infantry brigades, and an armour regiment). Rann of Kutch clash had resulted in the forward deployment of troops along the international border. The official history tells us about troop deployment in early July. The defensive positions were strengthened with barbed wire and mines. In the last week of July, the troops were ordered to completely dismantle the defences and return to barracks. When the Indians attacked, there were no mines or barbed wire. 

On persistence from his brigade commanders, GOC 10 Division permitted them to take up defensive positions during night 5^th / 6^th September, start time midnight. This implied that the troops would not be in position before 0400 hours and defensive positions could not be occupied before 0700 hours, 6^th September. Resultantly, infantry battalions, under command armour elements, and line parties of artillery observers bumped into the attackers while occupying the assigned forward defended localities/ artillery observation posts. None of the twenty odd bridges were prepared for demolition. These were haphazardly blown up belatedly in the face of the stiff enemy pressure. While the advance positions were overrun by the enemy, some elements ex 10 Division continued operating on the east bank of BRB till the cease-fire. All the enemy attacks on forward defended localities were beaten back, mainly by own artillery. The Indian claim that the invading divisions did not attempt to establish a bridgehead anywhere across the BRB Canal has been rejected by Singh and Rikhye (1991). 

Kasur Sector

Here Pakistan’s 11 Division (21, 52, and 106 Brigade), with under command 15 Lancers and 32 TDU*. was pitted against Indian 4 Mountain Division (7and 62 Mountain Brigade) with under command Deccan Horse. XI Corps reserve comprised 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (2x armour regiments). 

* TDU or Tank Delivery Unit was a euphemism for “armour regiment” to circumvent the ceiling on raising of new armour regiments through U.S funding. These were not tank- destroyer units, as erroneously reported by the Indian authors. 

Indians attacked all along the front on night 5^th /6^th September. Whereas Pakistan’s 52 Brigade and 106 Brigade were to defend the Kasur Sector along the BRB canal, 21 Brigade was located at Luliani (northwest of Kasur along Road Lahore-Kasur) and was 11 Division reserve for the counter-attack. Between 5^th and 6^th September, this brigade was made to zig-zag feverishly from Luliani to Kharian (some 130 km north-east of Lahore), and back to Luliani via Shahdara-Balloki-Raiwind. Someone, somewhere, was losing his nerves. 

At around 0500 hours, replicating 10 Division’s chaotic response (due mainly to GHQ’s fumbling) to the Indian attack in Lahore Sector, 11 Division units hurried up to occupy their defensive positions along the BRB canal just as the Indian offensive was unfurling itself. To the south of Ballanwala, Indian 62 Mountain Brigade (18 Rajputana Rifles, 9 J&K Rifles, and 13 Dogra) supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse captured Sehjra Salient and Rohi Nullah bund. To the north, 7 Mountain Brigade (4 Grenadiers, 7 Grenadiers, and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles), also supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse, failed to capture its assigned objectives – Ballanwala and the bridges to its north. 

Fighting went on throughout the day. Counter-attacking all along the front, 11 Division regained balance, threw back the enemy and recovered the area on the far bank of BRB, including Sehjra Salient. During the battles on 6^th September, 7 Grenadiers (7 Mountain Brigade) and 13 Dogra (62 Mountain Brigade) suffered such heavy casualties that they ceased to exist as cohesive units. Meanwhile 4 Mountain Division managed to withdraw to general area Asal Uttar. According to Chakravorty (2014):

 

“The withdrawal took place on September 07, and our troops were able to dig defences and lay mines. The three field companies laid the mines and the areas to the south and west of the defences were flooded. Pakistan allowed the division to prepare its defences methodically by not disturbing it on September 07”.

As mentioned earlier, in Phase 1 of the Pakistani offensive, 11 Division had already established a shallow bridgehead of sorts across Rohi Nullah with 2 FF ex 52 Brigade. Later on, the entire brigade was tasked to expand the bridgehead. The D day was delayed from 7^th to 8^th September due to the damage caused to the bridge on Rohi Nullah. In Phase 2, 1 Armoured Division was to breakout from the bridgehead along three axes: 4 Armoured Brigade to advance along Sobraon Branch and capture the bridges on Beas. ; 5 Armoured Brigade to advance on road Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind-Amritsar, remaining west of Kasur Branch; 12 Cavalry recce regiment) to advance along Kasur Branch and secure bridges en route; 3 Armoured Brigade to be in reserve. 

Between 8^th and 11^th September, the brigades of 1 Armoured Division launched a series of attacks against the enemy dug up around Asal Uttar. 5 Armoured Brigade again broke out from the bridgehead at 0700 hours on 8^th September. Under cover of artillery fire the advancing tanks moved within 900 meters of the enemy’s defended area. At this point, they were engaged by tanks of Deccan Horse. The Pakistani armour broke up into smaller groups and tried to infiltrate the enemy defences by carrying out an outflanking move. The Indians employed their tanks like pillboxes. Utilizing standing crops, the attackers were engaged by Deccan Horse, artillery fire, and tank hunting teams. Suffering heavy losses, Pakistanis retreated. During most of the attacks, the tanks were disabled on the minefields and effectively engaged by artillery, anti-tank weapons, and Indian tanks lying in ambush under cover of sugar cane crops. Wherever they tried to outflank the defender, Pakistani tanks were either bogged down or were channelized by the inundations into killing areas where they were destroyed at leisure. “Do not reinforce a failure” is a constant refrain during the exercises yet this dictum is quite often thrown overboard during an actual war.

Notwithstanding the alleged superiority of Patton tanks, Pakistani and Indian armour, as discussed earlier, possessed almost equal combat power in Kasur sector. The combat power of Pakistani armour was further degraded by the channelized terrain where Indian armour had transitioned into a defensive posture. 

“Why was the armoured division launched in an area unsuitable for armour?” “Does an armoured division break out through a bridgehead made by one infantry battalion”? 

(Reply by the commanding officers when General Hamid, Corps Commander of sorts, asked them on morning 11^th September “what went wrong”?)

Sialkot Sector

This sector is essentially the Ravi-Chenab corridor. Its western boundary is defined by River Chenab which enters Pakistan in the vicinity of Marala, north of Sialkot and, flowing northeast to southwest, cuts Grand Trunk road southwest of Gujrat. The eastern boundary of the corridor is marked by river Ravi. Here, the Radcliffe Line, running roughly parallel to the river, at places decides to cut right through it, creating a number of Pakistani and Indian enclaves on both the sides, notably the Pakistani enclave at Jassar and the adjacent Indian enclave at Dharam.

In this sector Pakistan’s 15 Division, consisting of four infantry brigades (24,101,104, and 115) and 6 Armoured Division, faced Indian I Corps, comprising 1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division, 14 Division, and 26 Division. Pakistan’s 6 Armoured Division was actually 100 Independent Armoured Brigade re- designated as armoured division. It was not a full strength division and consisted of divisional headquarters, two armoured regiments; 10 Cavalry, and 22 Cavalry (11 Cavalry was detached to command 7 division for the Chamb operation), two artillery regiments, two mechanized infantry battalions, and had no brigade headquarters. However, in the Sialkot sector, Pakistan Army also had four armour regiments under command 15 Division; 33 TDU, 25 Cavalry, 31 TDU, and 20 Lancers.

Indian 1 Armoured Division comprised 1 Armoured Brigade (17 Horse, 16 Cavalry and squadron, ex 62 Cavalry), 43 Lorried Brigade (2 Lancers, 62 Cavalry, less squadron, and 2x lorried infantry battalions), and Divisional Reserves (4 Horse and 2x lorried infantry battalions). Besides 1 Armoured Division, India also had the 3 Independent Armoured Brigade (2x armour regiments) located in Jammu, and an armour regiment each under 14 Division and 26 Division. It is said that the main malady with which the Indians suffered was having too much infantry and not knowing how to use it, while the Pakistani problem seems to have been having too many tanks and not knowing how to use them.

Notwithstanding the imbalances in 6 Armoured Division , if we combine its 2x armour regiments with 4x armour regiments under command 15 Division ( 31 TDU and 33 TDU though had second line tanks), we may roughly assign it the combat power of a fully fledged armoured division , i.e. a combat power value of 3. We also assign a combat power value of 1 to the 15 Division, a total value of 4.

Assigning Indian 1 Armoured Division a value of 3 , 3 independent Armoured Brigade a value of 2, and 6 Mountain Division , 14Division , and 26 Division a combat value of 1 each, India gets a total combat power value of 8. Responding to the Indian assertion that the Pattons were superior to the Shermans (though the superiority had not been translated into physical gains in Kasur sector), instead of 8, lower the total Indian combat power to 7 (this would also take into account the fact that the Indian armoured division had a lorried brigade and a reserve comprising just one armour regiment with two lorried infantry battalions). Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 49 for India and 16 for Pakistan or a 3 to 1 Indian superiority in Sialkot sector.

The Main Attack 

At 0600 hours, 8th September, Indian 1 Armoured Division broke out from the bridgehead established by 6 Mountain Division in general area Charwa. At about the same time , Pakistan’s 24 Brigade, which had just returned to Pasrur from Jassar, received information that 3 FF, which was left at Charwa and deployed as a screen, was overrun by the leading brigades of 6 Mountain Division (69 Brigade and 99 Brigade). Commander 24 Brigade had no idea of the quantum of the troops opposite him. Knowing little about tank warfare, he asked CO 25 Cavalry to do something.

Officers of the 25 Cavalry during  the battle of Charwa War. Standing 3rd from left : Lt Col Nisar (Kaka) - the Commanding Officer.

CO 25 Cavalry sent one of his squadrons to advance in line abreast formation towards Charwa, the reported point of enemy breakthrough. Meanwhile, he also alerted the remaining two squadrons to move towards Chawinda. By 1200 hours the whole of 25 Cavalry was deployed three squadrons up in line abreast formation opposite 1 Armoured Brigade leading the advance of Indian 1 Armoured Division. 1 Armoured Brigade was advancing two regiments up, with an inter-regiment gap of 3500 to 4000 meters. Each regiment was advancing one squadron up. Both the tank regiments had a clean run during the first 15 kilometers (6-7 kilometers according to Harbaksh Singh, sic) of their advance inside Pakistan. According to the Indian accounts, PAF attacked the leading Indian armour regiments at about 0840 hours at Chobara but was unable to hit any tank. 25 Cavalry tanks came in contact with Indian 16 Light Cavalry tanks, without a clue that they were up against Indian 1 Armoured Division.

A confused firefight followed in which both sides lost tanks. Both the Indian leading tank troop leaders were killed, thus leaving the leading squadron commander of 16 Light Cavalry clueless. CO 16 Light Cavalry tried to bring up another squadron, to outflank the Pakistani position in front from the east. Finally, the second squadron was also held up, having lost its squadron commander and unable to manoeuvre due to limited visibility and lack of manoeuvring space. As per General Gurcharan Singh, once the second squadron was held up, CO 16 Light Cavalry passed “exaggerated” reports to 1 Armoured Brigade commander, who in turn ordered 16 Light Cavalry not to advance any further.

In brief, 16 Light Cavalry’s advance was checked at Gadgor by 1000 hours, 8^th September. 17 Poona Horse, which was advancing on the left towards Tharoah , commenced its advance two squadrons up, but soon changed to one squadron up because of the limited fields of fire and observation which made command and control extremely difficult. It came in contact with 25 Cavalry at 0945 hours in Tharoah area and was also checked like 16 Light Cavalry. According to Gurcharan Singh, some firing took place in between tanks of 16 Light Cavalry and 17 Poona Horse. This happened because the inter- regiment gap between both the regiments was too less.

In brief, 16 Light Cavalry’s advance was checked at Gadgor by 1000 hours, 8^th September. 17 Poona Horse, which was advancing on the left towards Tharoah , commenced its advance two squadrons up, but soon changed to one squadron up because of the limited fields of fire and observation which made command and control extremely difficult. It came in contact with 25 Cavalry at 0945 hours in Tharoah area and was also checked like 16 Light Cavalry. According to Gurcharan Singh, some firing took place in between tanks of 16 Light Cavalry and 17 Poona Horse. This happened because the inter- regiment gap between both the regiments was too less.

By 1300 hours, commander 1Armoured Brigade reached the conclusion that he was held up by at least two Patton regiments and that there was no possibility of advancing direct towards Phillora without suffering unacceptable losses. He was further unnerved by reports of a ‘raid’ by enemy tanks on artillery guns and soft vehicles (which, in reality, was the firing between 62 Cavalry tanks re-crossing Degh Nadi, and own artillery battery). He concluded that his line of communication was not secure and decided to adopt a defensive posture for the security of his command. At 1400 hours he issued orders for withdrawing the brigade into a box around Sabzpir crossroads. All this was happening when there was just 25 Cavalry in front of 1 Armoured Division.

It may be noted that 43 Lorried Brigade advance on the other axis also went disastrously , less due to the enemy opposition and more due to poor and inefficient execution. 43 Lorried Brigade led by 2 Lancers reached Sabzpir cross roads at 1530 hours, where tanks of 1 Armoured Brigade opened fire on them, mistaking them for Pakistani tanks. Thus 12 Lorried Brigade also harboured at Sabzpir crossroads.

After 9^th September when the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division , and later the 1 Armoured Division , beefed up Pakistani strength, it was no longer a question of valour or superior generalship, but simple, unimaginative frontal battle with both sides having an equal number of tanks. 

Rajasthan Sector 

During the second week of September, Indian Army attacked and captured Gadra Post in the Rajasthan sector. The Indian move was aimed at drawing the Pakistani forces to the south to relieve the pressure on the Indian Army in Punjab. In a counterattack, Pakistan Army recaptured Gadra post. It also captured Munabao railway station and while progressing ahead, the Kishangarh Fort.

Saleem Akhtar Malik

5 September 2022

The author is a Pakistan Army veteran who regularly writes on national

and international affairs, defence, military history, and military technology. His talks on these subjects are aired on his YouTube Channel "The Observation Post". His blog "Sam1953.blogspot.com" features his articles. Tweets @saleemakhtar53.