The Dirty Dispatches

  

 

The inclination of the Pakistani rulers towards the inclusion of foreign powers for addressing Pakistan's domestic issues and regional conflicts can be attributed to their lack of confidence and, more importantly, as a ploy to drag their feet in the resolution of these very issues. This is because they want to keep the pot boiling as it facilitates self-perpetuation. To this end, they allow external forces to play an exaggerated role in Pakistan's domestic politics. Even a superpower cannot meddle in the internal affairs of a small state unless it is invited to do so. Egypt under Nasser was a Soviet client state, but despite the Soviet pressure Nasser refused to remove restrictions on the Egyptian communist party. This was different in the case of Pakistan, where the American diplomats were gradually allowed to play the role of kingmakers. 

According to Hussain (1993), in an assessment prepared by the United States embassy in Karachi in March 1955, four years before Pakistan formally granted bases to the US: 

" the US felt that after more than two years of crises, political power in Pakistan has been openly assumed by a small group of British –trained administrators and military leaders centering around Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and his two principal associates, General Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan…. …. The regime favors a strong central government, economic development through austerity measures and foreign aid, and close alignment with the U.S…… We believe that the present leadership would be favorably inclined towards US peacetime development of air bases for U.S use." (Paras. 9–14, 21). 

Once they were allowed to meddle in Pakistan’s internal affairs, the Americans grew arrogant and assumed an imperial, rather insulting, tone towards their Pakistani tenants. In an August 1955 dispatch to the State Department, ambassador Hildreth states: 

“Ambassador has told Iskander Mirza, and it will be made clear to Suharwardy and others, that the United States has no objection to the inclusion of Suharwardy in a high cabinet post………While fully understanding the necessity to avoid the US involvement in internal politics through any public stand, the fact is that the US relationship is so important to Pakistan that complete non-involvement is impossible. If embassy officers ignore Suharwardy, for example, for the next two weeks this may well be interpreted here as official policy indicative of disapproval of his inclusion in the cabinet. If he is cultivated by the embassy even on a purely social basis, an interpretation of US approval may be placed on such actions. Conclusion: (1) we should encourage Suharwardy through third parties to take a cabinet post under the new prime minister, protecting our public position at all times. (2) Embassy officers should make some effort to maintain pleasant personal and social contacts with Suharwardy” (Hussain,1993). 

The biggest indicator of poor and weak leadership is when a leader starts talking against his subordinates in front of others. It becomes even more reprehensible when he does so in front of strangers. According to a September 1956 dispatch by Hildreth, Iskander Mirza showed Hildreth and his British counterpart a copy of a four-page letter regarding foreign policy that he had drafted but had not yet sent to Suharwardy. In other words, the president of Pakistan showed a confidential official communication addressed to his prime minister to the foreign ambassadors even before it was seen by the prime minister (Hussain, 1993). 

Perhaps even more unbecoming than this breach of security was Iskander Mirza’s assessment of his other prime minister ( Ch. Muhammad Ali) which he conveyed to ambassador Hildreth and which the ambassador sent to Washington in a telegram in February 1956. Calling Ch. Muhammad Ali timid, weak, and perhaps cowardly, he even went to the extent of telling Hildreth to advise US Secretary of State Dulles to 

"Talk very bluntly with the prime minister and scold him for allowing an official of the foreign office for publicly saying that the reception given to Chinese vice president, Madame Sun Yat-Sen was greater than that given to vice president Nixon" (Hussain, 1993). This was the same Hildreth, who once called Pakistani diplomats “prostitutes”. 

The subsequent Pakistani rulers have proven themselves even better boot-lickers to the Americans than their predecessors. The people of Pakistan deserved better than what was delivered to them by their leaders, political as well as praetorian. While fretting over the rot that has become Pakistan's fate, one is reminded of the movie Terminator II where Sarah Connor, one of the leading characters, leaves a message etched on the table with a knife. It reads "No fate, except what we make". This country is what the collective consciousness of its leadership has turned it into, for the masses are powerless and directionless. 

Saleem Akhtar Malik

23 April 2022

References:

1.      Bhutto, Z.A. (1969). The Myth of Independence.Oxford University Press.

2.      Hussain,M., Hussain A. (1993). Pakistan: Problems of Governance.Chapter 4. Centre for Policy Research. Konark Publishers. New Delhi.