Remembering Operation Swift Retort

 India’s Confused Narrative

The transcript of Shekhar Gupta’s video talk:

We discover that the story we thought now had ended and was behind us had once again appeared on our headlines, and that is the story about Balakot and what happened the day after in the Rajauri, Mendhar, Nowshera area – the air skirmish which now is beginning to look more and more like a melee with lots of aircraft.

This has happened because a fairly well-known, reputed Pentagon journalist –Lara Seligman, has written a source-based article for Foreign Policy magazine. She is a reputed journalist who covers Pentagon for a long time and has good contacts.

Foreign Policy is a reputed magazine, which is edited by an Indian now – Abhi Agarwal.

She said her sources have told her that Pakistanis invited American diplomats to inspect all their F-16s and the Americans have counted and confirmed that all Pakistani F-16s are on the ground. On the ground means they have counted them and found that not one of them has been lost in the battle or in a crash recently.

What they mean is that if the story is correct, then the IAF claim that Wing Commander Abhinandan shot down one F-16 in the skirmish on morning February 27 cannot be right. This article is based on sources, but she has not quoted those officials. At the same time, hers is a weighty byline. Also, it has appeared in a credible publication. You cannot dismiss it out of hand.

But other questions arise. Questions like – Did the Americans also count all the Jordanian F-16s that the Pakistanis bought? They could have because that sale was approved by the Americans. But we do not know for sure if the Americans have oversight on those (F-16s) also.

Second, if this is the case, why aren’t the Americans also saying it? This is leading to many conspiracy theories, one (of them is) that Americans can’t accept that an F-16 was shot down by a MiG-21Bis, particularly when F-16 or a new version of   F-16(F-21) is likely to be a bidder in the next MMRCA contract for 114 fighter aircraft for IAF.

These theories are farfetched because, in a melee, anybody can shoot down anybody. This is not a classic, perfect case dog-fighting situation in which lots of aircraft are in the air and whosoever gets the chance exploits it. Obviously, in the

case of PAF pilots also, whoever shot down Abhinandan’s plane, it was an opportunity that presented itself, and (the Pakistani pilot) was successful. I do not think that it is such an ego issue with the manufacturers of F-16 or the Pentagon.

At the same time, this could be misleading – this could be a wrong statement. The aircraft that got shot down could have been a Jordanian F-16. In the 71 War, IAF shot down more than one Jordanian F-104 Star Fighter given on loan to PAF during the war. But I would shift this debate now to something else.

If, in 2019, when India is such a big power, much bigger than Pakistan, with a much bigger economy, much bigger armed forces – IAF budget is almost five times the budget of IAF, why should we even be caught in a situation where we should be debating whether one aircraft was shot down or not – whether in a skirmish like that the score was 1:1 or 0:1 from India’s point of view. Think about it. If you have such a powerful and large air force and Pakistan (also) sends a large force – 20+ aircraft all across the Loc and International border in Kashmir - some as decoys, some to create deception, some to set up an ambush, and some to bomb Indian military facilities – an assortment of aircraft, an air force which is several times more powerful, or at least which costs several times more, should have been able to inflict such heavy punishment on that Pakistani package, or battle group, or battle box, or whatever you call it, that they would never think again of trying something like this.

Therefore, if India had the right combination of aircraft, missiles, and range for something like this, Pakistan should have suffered damage of 5, 6 or 7 aircraft – a devastating blow. But it did not happen, why? Because: 1) Indian defence forces have not spent their money sensibly. You can blame – the bureaucrats, the (military) commanders, the politicians. But the fact is if you are spending that much more money on defence than Pakistan and your economy is that much larger, by this time you should have built such tactical superiority in crucial areas that Pakistan would not even think of retaliating or interfering with you. That is (however) not the situation.

I have talked about it in the past and written about it that the Pakistani missiles on F-16s, at this point, outrange everything with India except a few Mirages which carry the new French MICA missile. How did we allow this asymmetry to build in? That asymmetry is now here for almost 8 years. For 8 years India has lived with it, going over this contract or that contract, or fighting over Rafale, etc., etc. Rafale will come when Rafale will come. This missile gap should have been bridged much earlier; 2) In Indian defence, the mindset still is more of everything. Do you need more of everything? Do you need everything? If you still have limited money – it is still much more than Pakistan (though), then you can use that money in a way that creates superiorities and asymmetries in situations that you can anticipate in real life.

A big, full front war, say, from Kashmir to Kutch, is unlikely in today’s environment. Even if it does happen, it will not last for more than a few hours, maybe a day. But to think that IAF will invest in numbers and then overwhelm the PAF with numbers – it will do so eventually, but it will take time. Ten days, fourteen days, I am quite sure in that much time IAF will establish air superiority in many areas, though it will take a lot of attrition. But that is not the kind of warfare or fighting that is anticipated today.

What is anticipated today is something that happened on February 26 and 27 – a raid inside Pakistan, a retaliation, and then a skirmish which actually became like a melee because so many aircraft of different types got involved. This was actually two Third World air forces fighting for the first time with BVR missiles with limited radar and AWAC support.

What did India lack? India realized that it has fewer AWAC or AEW aircraft than Pakistan. So when one was landing and the other was taking off, there was a gap (in radar coverage) created. Why should India be in a situation like this? It is because of much confusion. India decided to buy an AWAC aircraft and then DRDO said we will put the dome and the radar and equipment on it. That is now taking time. Those things should not happen. India should have a much better AWAC and ground radar ability than Pakistan. India should have a much better combination of deterrent airpower, so deterrent that they can go inside Pakistan, if they need to, without worrying about a challenge there. If you bill that, the chances are that you will never have to use that power.

But if you then say let me have two squadrons of this, four squadrons of that, and let me upgrade my Jaguars, that is mindset incrementalism in which our armed forces have got caught. Find the right kind of money and invest it correctly.

Somebody has to think where am I most likely to use force?

In areas, where there are troops posted on ground, you are more likely to use sniper rifles in skirmishes than tanks. It is shocking that India still has sniper rifles of another era, so Pakistan sniper rifles outrange Indian sniper rifles. Why is India still using 1950s vintage L-50 anti-aircraft guns and old SAMS? What happened in Srinagar that an Israeli AD missile fired hit that (IAF) helicopter of Russian origin? Were their systems (including IFF) compatible with each other? Have right investments been made in those areas? Have the right (kind) of exercises been carried out? Those are the things India will have to do.

India is now a richer country than Pakistan even on per capita basis. Indian forces have to get out of this Third World mindset of fighting the last war again….

If you look at it now, this experience tells you that the air force was inadequate in that area. Whatever the score on February 27, I can say without any doubt that IAF could have done, and should have done, enormously better than what it did on that morning. It was outnumbered because it was not prepared in that area. It was also outranged, and there was, obviously, confusion that led to the shooting down of an (IAF) helicopter by friendly fire.

Let’s stop squabbling. There are many lessons here. IAF should come out (with the  facts) now. They just don’t keep talking through sources. They should come out in the open and present evidence and assert their claims. That will be the right thing to do. But having said this, the larger issue is taking the lessons of February 26 and 27 forward.

IAF only has 40 odd Mirages. Some have been upgraded and some have not been upgraded, but when it came to bombing Balakot you had to take aircraft out of the same 40 odd (Mirages). When you had to mount credible air defenc against the intruder, you again had to use Mirages out of the same small lot.

What does it tell you? It tells you to invest in technology, range, and superiority. Look beyond numbers because numbers, in any case, are whittling down. In 2002

IAF was about 40 squadrons and PAF was about 18. Today PAF is 22 and IAF is down to 30. Just building up those squadrons will need far too much money. The important thing is to invest in quality.

A MiG-21 Bis kind of aircraft doesn’t get caught in the forefront of a modern BVR melee like the one over Rajauri. Was the F-16 shot down or not, or was it another aircraft – A JF-17 or a Mirage, because something was shot down. There were more parachutes in the air. Those videos everybody has seen and those definitely were not Indian pilots. The Pakistan spokesman said two pilots were captured, one was in the hospital. He said they were searching for another. Imran khan said in the afternoon that they had pilot(s) with them. It could be my presumption that in the fog of war, they took a PAF pilot to be an Indian pilot. It could be. I am just guessing.

Having said so, I think it is a very minor argument now. The larger argument is should IAF ever get caught into a situation like this where it has to squabble with Pakistan over whether one aircraft was shot down or two. These opportunities have to be settled decisively. To that extent, February 27 was an opportunity that IAF clearly missed. In fact, it was lucky that more MiG -21s or other Indian aircraft were not lost.