India's claim on Jammu & Kashmir

The Indians appreciate that a future war in this area will be a two-front war in which Pakistan and China will launch a three-direction combined offensive against the Indian positions in Ladakh and Baltistan along the western (Pakistan), and northern and eastern (China) approaches. This offensive may result in India losing all the areas northeast, east, and southeast of Leh, making the Indus River the new line of control with Pakistan and China (Rikhye, 2012).

Historical background

If not for the Sikh forays during the 19^th Century, and the engineered accession of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947, post-independence India would not have shared borders with Pakistan in the Vale of Kashmir, and with Pakistan and China in the Karakorams and the Ladakh region. 

However, independent India considered itself   the successor to the British Empire in India and maintained that since the northern frontiers were defined by what was then the government of India, the post-independence government of India was the guarantor of Tibet and heir to all the territories occupied by the Sikhs and Dogras.

The First Kashmir War in 1947-48 left Pakistan holding not only the mountain barrier separating the Valley from the plains of West Punjab, but also in possession of Gilgit & Baltistan. Later, the Sino-Indian border war effectively quarantined Tibet from India. While keeping in view Pakistan’s grievances, one should not be oblivious of India’s frustrations. 

In the 21^st Century, huge iron, copper, and natural gas deposits have been discovered in Afghanistan, not to mention the enormous gas reserves in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. India can have access to these natural deposits, but this giant plug controlled by Pakistan.

The Maharaja of Kashmir had laid claim on Aksai Chin, though the area had never been physically held by the state. The claim was based on a survey carried out in 1865 by William Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India. According to the line drawn by Johnson, known as the Johnson Line, Aksai Chin was shown as part of J&K. 

This was the time when China did not control Xingjian, so this line was never presented to the Chinese. Based on Johnson’s demarcation, the Maharaja claimed the territory to the north as far as the Kunlun Mountains, i.e., the whole of Aksai Chin. The Chinese had never accepted the claim.

During the 1950s, unbeknownst to the world, and while India had no physical presence in this area, Chinese built a 1,200 kilometre (750 miles) road connecting Xingjian with western Tibet, of which 179 kilometres (112 miles) ran south of the Johnson Line through the Aksai Chin region claimed by India. The Indians did not learn the existence of the road until one year after China formally annexed Tibet. Before the 1962 border war, the Chinese had moved further west.

 ShaksgamValley

The ShaksgamValley, claimed by Pakistan until 1963, comprises an area of approximately 5,800 square kilometers (2,239 square miles) along both sides of the Shaksgam River. Pakistan relinquished its claim to the tract under a border agreement with China in 1963 with the proviso that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute. 

This area was never under the physical control of Pakistan. The compromise border had left about two-thirds on China's side, but while Pakistan in the main had given up only claims on maps, China would be withdrawing from about 750 square miles. This 750 square mile area was used by Pakistani shepherds for sheep grazing.

Siachen Glacier

Siachen glacier was a no man’s land located to the southeast of the Karakoram Tract and at the extreme northern end of the Line of Control that separates Pakistan’s Northern Areas from Indian-held Kashmir. In the past, armies of both countries had been sending patrols to the glacier. In the villages located on the periphery of the glacier, Pakistani currency was the legal tender. Pakistan had also been hosting mountaineering expeditions to the glacier. Based on the historicity of the facts, Pakistan had a silent claim on the glacier.

In the early 1980s, a Pakistani advertisement for procurement of high altitude Mountain Gear in a foreign mountaineering magazine prompted the Indians to launch a brigade-size operation to seize Siachen. The Pakistan Army was found napping. As a result of its operation, India gained over 1,000 square miles (3,000 square kilometers) of territory in this area. 

Presently, India controls the entire 76 kilometers (47 miles) long glacier and two of the three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier- Sia La and Bilafond La. Pakistan holds Gyong and Bilafond glaciers to the west and Gyong La Pass, which dominates Shyok and Nubra river valleys and Indian Army’s access to Leh district.

Indians themselves were not able to give a convincing justification as to why, in 1984, they invaded the desolate glacier. The arguments forwarded by them so far are?

1. According to the 1949 Agreement, as interpreted by the Indians, Siachen was a no man’s land and thus belonged to India.

2. Pakistan was provoking India by sending mountaineering teams to the glacier.

3. The Tri-junction of China, Pakistan, and India, which is presently located near the northern tip of the glacier, would have been located at the  Karakoram Pass. By occupying the glacier Indian Army had pushed the Tri- junction to the west, short of Conway saddle. According to Arpi(2016), Pakistan’s occupation of the Siachen up to the Karakoram Pass would lead to their domination of Nubra Valley and the route down to Leh. This is an invalid argument because the  Pakistan Army controls Gyong La Pass, which dominates Shyok and Nubra river valleys, and the Indian Army’s access to Leh district.

4. The Indian occupation of Siachen creates a formidable wedge between Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin. This implies that the Pakistani occupation of Siachen would have facilitated a Chinese offensive through the glacier to roll down Indian defences from the west and threaten Ladakh. This again is not convincing because Indians themselves concede that the most likely Chinese offensive in this area will be from the east, across the theDepsang plains.

5. Occupation of the glacier was essential for the defence of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). India maintains a landing ground at DBO for rapid deployment to block the KKH in a future two-front war with Pakistan and China. The landing ground can also be used for airdropping supplies to Siachen in case roads get blocked due to inclement weather. However, the landing ground will be quickly neutralized by China because, as compared with India, China has a far superior infrastructure in the area.

The author wants to help the Indians by creating a stronger case for them for the occupation of the Siachen glacier. For the purpose of this argument, the author will perform the role of the Devil’s Advocate. He thinks that the Indians occupied the Siachen glacier because:-

1. Back in 1984, India had been stopped from playing any role whatsoever in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, India’s ally, was being drubbed in Afghanistan by the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen. For India, it was time to vent its anger (and that of its ally) by needling Pakistan in an unexpected area.

2. The Sikh militancy in east Punjab, sponsored by Pakistan to interdict India’s line of communications to the IHK, was another big irritant for India for which it wanted to repay Pakistan in kind.

3. Nearly seven of the world’s highest mountain peaks are clustered west and northwest of Siachen. Every year thousands of tourists visit this area. The capture of Siachen would create an Indian claim on these Karakoram peaks. In fact, India had issued postage stamps showing K-2 as Indian territory.

Capturing the Siachen glacier does not make any sense unless it is used as a jump-off point to advance further west to threaten Skardu or recover Shakgam Valley from China. The glacier may not be having an immediate strategic significance, but it provides access to Indian patrols for reconnaissance of the area west of Saltoro Ridge (though this is contested by the Pakistani commanders. 

A mule track exists which starts from Leh which leads to Khapalu, Karmango, and Skardu. However, this track cannot be used for a projected operation across the Saltoro Ridge to capture Skardu and/or Shaksgam Valley. A large-scale offensive cannot rely on mule tracks. Any Indian offensive to capture Skardu will be based on a heliborne/airborne operation across the Kargil heights.

If you look at the map, up till 1984, when India occupied the Siachen Glacier, Northern Ladakh was sandwiched between the Siachen Glacier and the Aksai Chin Plateau. This narrow wedge was widened when the Indian army ingressed into the Siachen Glacier, giving India a breathing space.

China’s strategy in Ladakh is to control all the dominating features along the western approaches into Aksai Chin. The Depsang Plains, which constitute the bottleneck area between the Glacier and the Plateau, are suitable for armour operations. The Chinese consider an Indian presence in Depsang Plains threatening as it permits the Indians to launch an armour operation to overrun Aksai Chin. 

As an interim measure, the Chinese would like the LAC in this area to run along the Shyok River and down south to the western edge of Pangong Lake. The Indians appreciate that a future war in this area will be a two-front war in which Pakistan and China will launch a three-direction combined offensive against the Indian positions in Ladakh and Baltistan along the western (Pakistan), and northern and eastern (China) approaches. This offensive may result in India losing all the areas northeast, east, and southeast of Leh, making the Indus River the new line of control with Pakistan and China (Rikhye, 2012).

By holding Siachen, India is presently threatening the Chinese- controlled Shaksgam valley. To ward off any threat from the opposite side, both China and India have deployed their armour on their sides of the Despang Plains. If China closes the bottleneck in an armor operation, the Indian occupation of Siachen will become untenable and northern Ladakh will be squeezed between the Siachen Glacier and the  Aksai Chin Plateau. 

I conclude my analysis by quoting the retired Indian Lt General Harcharanjit Singh Panag’s assessment of the Chinese political aims against India. During his service, the general had been the GOC-in-C of the Indian army's Northern Command, headquartered at Udhampur and GOC-in-C of the army's Central Command at Lucknow. In an interview, the general highlighted the Chinese political aims as follows:-

1. To impose its hegemony over India by undermining its international/regional status.

2. Secure the 1959 Claim Line to gain a strategic advantage.

3. Prevent the development of border infrastructure in critical areas that threaten Aksai Chin/other usurped territory.

In September 202, Quint*,  the Indian website, reported:

Chinese soldiers have marked their presence at a crucial Y-junction near the Burtse patrol camp in Ladakh, blocking Indian Army’s access to IAF forward airbase at Daulat Beg Oldi.  TheY-junction is located at the Burtse patrol camp in Ladakh. Barely 30 kms south of the strategically important Daulat Beg Oldi forward base, this Y-junction is also known as ‘bottleneck’ in Indian strategic circles because any patrol seeking to reach either Point 10 or Point 13 along the Line of Patrol, must cross this junction(Gautam,2020.

*Y-junction map and information on Despang foray courtesy Gautam,N. (2020). “India- China Faceoff: PLA Blocking Patrols in Depsang Since March”.Quint

With the PLA now firmly in control of the Y-Junction south of Daulat Beg Oldi, it can next attack across the Depsang Plain to reach the Karakoram Pass. The Pakistan Army is already holding the western Ridgeline of Saltoro.

Saleem Akhtar Malik

January 2

The author is a Pakistan Army veteran who regularly writes on national and international affairs, defence, military history, and military technology. His talks on these subjects are aired on his YouTube Channel "The Observation Post". His blog "Sam1953.blogspot.com" features his articles. Tweets @saleemakhtar53.

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