The 71 War - Could India have occupied West Pakistan also?

 

After the fall of Dhaka, Indira Gandhi, ostensibly under pressure from the Soviets and America, declared a unilateral ceasefire in the west also. Since then, a spirited discussion has ensued in the Indian, international as well as Pakistani circles that had the superpowers not intervened, the Indian Army would have finished West Pakistan also. In this discussion, which is continuing to date, praetorians, defense analysts, diplomats, and media persons, particularly from India have propounded various theories.

 J.N. Dixit, an Indian diplomat, remarked that, if ordered, the Indian Army would have marched in Rawalpindi. After reading various Indian analyses, the author has identified three common Indian war objectives:-

a. Defeating Pakistan Army in East Pakistan and creating Bangladesh.

b. Destroying Pakistan’s war potential for a period (depending upon the analyst) from a few years to half a century.

c. Capturing Azad Kashmir, or at least its southern portion.

 As discussed earlier, Pakistani military and political leadership, due to its contorted thinking, helped India in achieving this objective. The Soviet Union, India’s ally in the war, wanted to keep it under the leash, hence the Soviet pressure. India had to pay the price of borrowing Soviet power. The United States had to make some cosmetic gestures to avoid being labeled as an impotent superpower, so it also made some noises.

 As for destroying Pakistan’s war potential and “recovering Azad Kashmir”, was the Indian Army capable of achieving these objectives? It could have if it were prepared for a protracted war and the sacrifices such a war demanded, not for a period of weeks, but for more than a year, maybe longer. Let us have a look at the psyche of the Indian civil and military leadership.

 During the first Kashmir war, the  Indian Army fought essentially against a ragtag force of tribesmen, locals, and retired/serving army personnel on leave. Pakistan Army entered the fray only when the Indian Army was threatening to advance beyond line Uri- Poonch- Naushera. Indians captured two-thirds of the disputed state but failed to get the mountain barrier separating the Valley from the Potohar plateau vacated from the raiders/Pakistan Army. It also could not dislodge the enemy from Gilgit and Baltistan. 

Even when things were going in favour of the Indian Army, Nehru, being a very cautious man, knocked at the United Nations door. After the war, the Indian generals claimed that had they been given a few more weeks, they would have driven Pakistan out of Jammu& Kashmir. Similar claims were made by the Pakistani generals – had they been allowed to go ahead with Operation Venus, they would have liberated the Valley.

 According to Rikhye (1988), India’s operational strategy on the western front was 1) I Corps to eliminate the entire Sialkot salient, prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. In conjunction with frontal attacks by 19 and 25 Divisions in Kashmir, this would have cracked the front and Azad Kashmir would have fallen. 2) XI corps to remain in a defensive role in the Lahore sector to conserve strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses. 3) Southern Command to launch a corps size operation in Sindh to i) cut the line of communication between Karachi and Lahore at Hyderabad and Rahim Yar Khan to ease the pressure on Indian forces operating in the north, and, ii) to occupy maximum territory in Sindh for future bargaining.

After the surrender at Dhaka, India had started moving its forces to the western front. The table below shows the comparative strengths after the cease-fire in the east:

17 December 71 - Comparative Strength on the Western Front

India	Pakistan
16x Inf Divs*	10x Inf Divs
1x Armd Div	2x Armd Divs
2x (I) Inf Bde	1x (I) Inf Bde
1x (I) Armd Bde	3x (I) Armd Bdes

*9Div HQ had been transferred to the west.

Outflanking Azad Kashmir

 In Sialkot Sector, Indian I Corps moved very slowly in the face of determined Pakistani opposition. After fourteen days of fighting, Indian forces were still on the eastern outskirts of the town of Shakargarh, meaning they had gained territory only at a pace of about one kilometer a day (Clary,2013). This was not the way if they had aimed at eliminating the Sialkot salient prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. 

Talking of outflanking Azad Kashmir from the south. It looks very neat on paper, and impressive in a model discussion, but ground realities are different. The Indians had to first clear the Sialkot salient, and they had barely contacted Shakargarh town. Swinging north after contacting G.T road involved attacking with armour, infantry following in zone. 

In Ravi-Chenab Corridor, Indians had three infantry divisions (36, 39, and 34) and two independent armoured brigades (2 and 16). Pitted against the Indians in this corridor were Pakistan’s 8 and 15 Divisions and 8(I) Armd Bde. Moreover, after the fall of Chamb, brigades ex 6 Armd Div and 17 Div, detached to command 23 Div and 2 (I) Armd Bde , had reverted to command their parent formations. So the final tally was Indian 3x inf divs and 2x (I) armd bdes against Pakistan’s 3x inf divs (8,15, and 17), 1x armd div, and 1x (I) armd bde. These Pakistani formations were attrited during the war, so were the Indian formations. 

The Indians had an advantage that they could move additional divisions to this area from the China front. Switching of Indian forces from the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor (say, 1 (I) Armd Bde) would have created an imbalance in that sector. We have seen how Pakistan’s 7 Division slipping to the south had unnerved the Indians. We agree that the only fresh formations available to the Indian Army would come either from the China front or the eastern theatre (available after three weeks).

 Swinging north to outflank Pakistani defenses, Indian Army would have to:

1) advance west of the foothills to first reach the Grand Trunk Road. This was necessary to create space west of the international border for launching a large offensive. In such an eventuality Pakistan’s 17 Division would occupy a new defensive line on the northern bank of River Chenab, north of Gujrat, whereas 6 Armoured Division and 111 Brigade* would have constituted the reserve in general area Jhelum. In case the Indians tried to probe west of G.T. Road, Pakistan had 8(I) Armd Bde which could have been employed in a delaying role.

2) Cross Chenab River in an encounter/deliberate crossing, depending upon how quickly the defender organized his defenses on the northern bank.

3) Invest Gujrat, Lalamusa, and Kharian. These towns/Kharian cantonment cannot be bypassed. Even if the Indian Army managed to bypass any of these towns, there was no Mukti Bahini to protect their rear.

4) Cross River Jhelum south of Jhelum city in an encounter/deliberate crossing.

5) Invest Jhelum.

6) Negotiate the Tarraki Ridge (an extension of the Salt Range) north of Jhelum. The Tarraki defile zig zags along a gorge and can be easily defended with a small force.

7) All the time protect the eastern flank from Pakistani 23 Div and 12 Div. There were chances the Indian flank protection force (minimum one infantry division) would be sucked in by 23 and 12 Divisions.

Had the Indian Army instead of swinging north after reaching the G.T. road, tried to roll down Pakistan’s 23 and 12 Division defenses by remaining close to the mountains, hopping from one mountain feature to another, it would be another slogging match. Trying to dislodge the enemy from its prepared defenses would be a very time-consuming and frustrating experience. Besides, the Indians would have to negotiate Chenab and Jhelum Rivers anyway.

So, 12 Division and 23 Division would not abandon their defenses to save Rawalpindi, the Pakistani front in Azad Kashmir would not crack, and Indian attempt at outflanking from the south would get bogged down somewhere between Gujrat and Lala Musa. Having said this, the author would like to ask this fellow J.N. Dixit if he has ever heard a blast other than one from a tire burst?

Conserving Strength before Attacking Lahore

 It is said that the Indian XI corps remained in a defensive role in the Lahore sector to conserve strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses. The Indians claim that during the 1965 war, they had deliberately stopped at the BRB canal because entering Lahore was a prohibitive option.

This claim has been rebutted by Pushpinder and Rikhye (1991). They would know that in 1965 Pakistan had deployed troops from the Frontier Constabulary in Lahore and other major cities. Fighting a prolonged war was not a palatable option for Pakistani military top brass, yet they had deployed the Frontier Constabulary to embroil the attacking Indians in a war of attrition had the Indians entered Lahore. In 1971, the military junta and Bhutto had written off East Pakistan, but Pakistanis had to fight for their very survival in case the Indians tried to absorb West Pakistan.In 1982, the Israelis had stopped short of entering Beirut, which was held by the PLO. Would the Indians take the risk of entering Lahore?

Cutting Pakistan’s Line of Communications

And lastly about operations in the south. The Indian Southern Command was to launch a corps size operation in Sindh to cut Pakistan’s line of communications between Karachi and Lahore and to occupy maximum territory in Sindh for future bargaining. The Indian Army did take large areas in the deserts along the southern border, capturing 7,500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory. Even so, the Indian Army penetrated approximately 50 kilometers during the two-week conflict, at a rate of four kilometers per day. Most of the territory was gained against essentially no Pakistani opposition and the strength of the Indian attack had dissipated considerably by the end of the war when it finally did face Pakistani forces.It is doubtful that future gains would have been at a similar rate. In the south, the Indian offensive was stopped well before it reached the valuable irrigated greenbelt areas to the east of the Pakistani city of Hyderabad (Clary, 2013).

The Aftermath

We have discussed in detail how the outcome of the war in the eastern theatre was foretold. A beleaguered eastern command of the Pakistan Army, cut off from its logistics base in West Pakistan, devoid of air cover, with a hostile population breathing down its neck, had two options 1) fight till death 2) surrender. It did not choose the first option because GHQ had ordered the eastern command to lay down arms, otherwise, West Pakistan would also be lost (?). We have also discussed how the surrender at Dhaka was planned by Bhutto, Lieutenant General Gul Hasan, and Air Marshall Rahim Khan when they were sent to Beijing in November 1970. 

 Till it was the fighting in East Pakistan, it was fine with India. But they were not sure about the outcome of the war in the western theatre. As mentioned earlier Maneckshaw, in his order of the day on commencement of hostilities in the western theatre, had committed himself to destroy Pakistan’s war machine. However, in the west, Pakistan had held its hand and kept its powder dry. PAF was still a potent force, so was the army. And Pakistan navy still had three submarines. 

Most of all, there was no friendly population and Mukti Bahini to augment the Indian war effort. It has already been discussed why the Indian Army could not outflank Azad Kashmir by attempting to roll down Pakistani defenses from south to north.

 Once the defender is fighting for its survival, the invader cannot be sure if the capture of this or that territory will break the front. Had the Indian Army even contacted G.T. Road, the only way to break the rest of Pakistan was to threaten Rawalpindi-Pakistan Army’s nerve centre. We have discussed this possibility in detail and proved it impracticable.

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