1971 - The Air War

 

In December 1971, the PAF had a total of 14 squadrons out of which one squadron was located in East Pakistan. IAF, on the other hand, had 36 squadrons of which 10 squadrons were located in the East and the remaining 26 squadrons in the West. The ratio of combat air power in the East was 10:1 in favour of India. In the West it was 2:1 in India’s favour.

Prologue to the War - The Rashid Minhas Episode

On 20 August 1971,  before noon, PAF Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas was getting ready to take off in a T-33 jet trainer in Karachi, Pakistan. His second solo flight in that type of aircraft. Minhas was taxiing toward the runway when a Bengali instructor pilot, Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahman, signalled him to stop and then climbed into the instructor's seat. The jet took off and Rahman turned towards India. Minhas radioed PAF Base Masroor with the message that he was being hijacked. The air controller requested that he resend his message and he confirmed the hijacking. Later investigation showed that Rahman intended to defect to India  along with the jet trainer. 

In the air, Minhas struggled physically to wrest control from Rahman; both men tried to overpower the other through the mechanically linked flight controls. Some 32 miles (51 km) from the Indian border, the jet crashed near Thatta. Both men were killed. Minhas was posthumously awarded Pakistan's top military honour, the Nishan-eHaider, and became the youngest man and the only member of the Pakistan Air Force to win the award. 

Similarly, Rahman was honoured by Bangladesh with their highest military award, the Bir Sreshtho.Minhas's Pakistan military citation for the Nishan-e-Haider states that he forced the aircraft to crash to prevent Rahman from taking the jet to India. 

The PAF’s attack capability in 1971 consisted of exactly 16 B-57s and 20 Mirage IIIEP. The latter were trained and utilized for air superiority. The PAF workhorse, as in 1965, was F-86 Sabre of which there were 6 squadrons. Besides, there were 3 squadrons of F-6(MiG19), and a squadron of F-104 interceptors. The Sabre was a sub-sonic multi-role fighter aircraft that was used for interception, ground attack, and bombing. F-6 was primarily a sub-sonic ground attack aircraft.

PAF Order of Battle 

(WesternTheatre) 

Squadron No	Aircraft
5	Mirage IIIP
7	B-57B
8	B-57B
9	F-104A
11	F-6
14	Sabre VI
15	Sabre VI
16	F-86
17	Sabre VI
18	Sabre VI
19	F-86
23	F-6
25	F-6
Total:13

Singh, Rikhye and Steinemann (1992)

 

IAF Order of Battle 

Aircraft	Squadron No	Total Squadrons
Gnat	2,9,15,18,21,22,23,24	8
Mystere	3,31	2
Canberra	5,16,35,106	4
Hunter	7,14,17,20,27,37	6
Marut	10,222	2
MIG-21	1,4,8,28,29,30,45,47	8
Su-7	26,32,101,108,220,221	6
	Total	36

Singh, Rikhye and Steinemann (1992)

At the Air Command Centre

Rawalpindi

1600 hours – 3 December, 1971

Squadron Leader Arshad Sami Khan (2008) writes:

“We finally arrived at a tall gate with high walls that had barbed wire on top and security lights; he (General Hamid, sic) stopped and honked. A guard in army uniform peeped out from the window of the security room next to the gate; he then came out and walked up to the jeep to establish our identities; then recognizing the President he saluted smartly and opened the gate. As we drove in, we were received by Air Marshal Rahim Khan at the porch of the building, which looked more like a warehouse of some sort. However, it turned out to be the Air Command Centre.

 It was very well camouflaged; housed in an inconspicuous concealed building, located in a populated yet obscure area. When we stepped into this shabby looking warehouse, I was taken aback by the appearance of a very modern facility; inside it was a different world altogether. I knew most of the officers working there; a majority of them my seniors. They stood up to greet the President and immediately thereafter turned to their intricate tasks.

At the Air Command Centre it was extremely interesting to watch the air war theatre, as I could guess how my own flights too must have been monitored in the 1965 war by the bigwigs of the country. When we arrived, several flights of fighter-bomber aircraft, mainly F-86, were already airborne, and on their way to attack Indian airbases along the West Pakistan border. 

Briefing the President Air Vice Marshal Jamal (who later rose to the rank of Air Chief Marshal on becoming Chief of Air Staff) said that the bulk of the force comprised of the F-86 and MiG -19, fighter bombers, each carrying 2 bombs of 1000 pounds weight. Their objective was to bombard runways of Indian airbases in close proximity of the West Pakistan border. 

I was very surprised at the use of F-86 for the said purpose, as I had flown that aircraft extensively. In fact, during the 1965 war I had the maximum combat hours in entire PAF – 61 hours and 15 minutes (second to me was a transport pilot with 33 hours on a C-130). I had flown a variety of missions on F-86 in multiple roles during peace time practice, as well as during the 1965 Turko-Greek war and 1965 war; from fighter interception and dogfights to its roles as ground support aircraft. 

The aircraft was excellent when it came to interception, dogfights, strafing, and rocketry. However, it was not very accurate in its bombing role, especially high-level bombing. It required climbing to 10,000 feet and going into a 45-degree dive and releasing the bombs by about 4-5000 feet at speeds of 460 knots. This meant that having flown at tree-top level to avoid Indian radars, upon arrival at their targets our formations would have to pull –up to 10,000 feet. 

In doing so, they would expose themselves to a barrage of Indian ack-ack fire and even more deadly, the Surface to Air missiles. Further, F-86 could carry only two bombs, each weighing a thousand pounds. The damage with such bombs to a runway from a direct hit could be repaired in a matter of few hours. If intercepted by the Indian fighters, they would have to jettison all loads including these bombs to be able to engage the Indian fighter interceptors in dogfights. 

I wonder why did they not choose the tried-out 1965 war formula of attacking and destroying IAF aircraft on the ground in surprise attacks such as the ones underway. Since such operations are planned at the highest level one expects the planners to have considered all those elements and more. As such, one simply accepts their judgment. I thus quietly watched the goings-on. Just as our aircraft struck their targets Army and Navy too went into action and a bloody war started on the Western front as well”.

According to Squadron Leader Arshad Sami khan (2008): 

The 1971 War, we now have the concrete evidence, was choreographed by Bhutto, Air Marshall Rahim-the Air Chief, and Lieutenant General Gul Hasan, the Chief of the General Staff. The planning for Pakistan Army’s defeat was done in November1971 when the three of them were sent by President Yahya to Beijing to solicit Chinese help for the war that was looming large on the horizon. Bhutto was heading the Pakistani delegation.

According to Singh,Rikhye and Steinemann (1992):

The air war in the East was brief and intense. The IAFs Eastern Command flew 1978 sorties from December 3 to 15, of which 1178, or about 80 per day, were in direct support of the ground forces. As mentioned above, India had ten squadrons in the East, and the result could be nothing short of the destruction of the tiny PAF contingent, which to give it credit, kept flying till its three airfields were knocked out.

The PAF, According to Fricker, claimed 28 IAF aircraft in the East. He adds that no F-86 was lost on the ground because of excellent camouflage. There could, then, be no question of an offensive strategy. Nonetheless, since no air force would like to fight just a defensive battle, Pakistani strategy called for a pre-emptive strike to reduce the odds, and throughout the war, it continued to send B-57s singly or in pairs for harassing attacks to keep the Indian defences on its toes.

In the West, Pakistan opened its account with 28 airstrikes. These were delivered with great skill, arriving undetected over their targets. However, there was just enough daylight to attack their targets. The accuracy was bad, and no results were achieved. Some three hundred meters of the runway at Amritsar was rendered inoperable for some hours and the Amritsar radar station was slightly damaged.

The PAF’s strategy in the West mirrored Army’s strategy of conserving its assets for the decisive phase when IAF would shift its almost eight squadrons from the East (The PAF, according to Fricker, claimed 28 IAF aircraft in the East), and, in tandem with the Army, launch the final offensive against West Pakistan.

Accordingly, it withheld four of its 13 squadrons in the West from combat, to be conserved for the support of Tikka Khan’s last-ditch II Corps offensive. It was due to this PAF strategy that enabled IAF to achieve local air superiority in the west where required, for example, over Karachi, Sind, and Shakargarh where Indian 1Corps was making its big push.