The 71 War - Conduct of Operations

 

Indian forces crossing the border, launched a full-scale invasion in East Pakistan on night 20^th /21^st November 1971, attacking simultaneously as many as 23 salients along the border. The purpose of these attacks was to knock the Pakistani forces away from the border and gain space for the establishment of firm bases to be used subsequently for launching major attacks. In many places, these attacks were beaten back by the defenders. However, the much larger Indian forces kept the defenders embroiled.  The Government of Pakistan just issued a proclamation of a state of emergency.

The Opposing Forces

Eastern Theatre

Order of Battle 

 Night 20th-21st November 

Districts	Pakistan	India
Dhaka Tangail Mymensingh	36 Adhoc Div	101 Comm Zone 95 Mtn Bde FJ Sector Bde 167 Inf Bde 5 Mtn Bde
Sylhet Comilla Noakhali Chittagong	14 Inf Div 39 Adhoc Div 97 (I) Inf Bde	IV Corps 8 Mtn Div 57 Mtn Div 23 Mtn Div
Rajshahi Bogra Dinajpur  Rangpur  Pabna	16 Inf Div	XXXIII Corps 20 Mtn Div 6 Mtn Div 50 (I) Para Bde 71 Mtn Bde MF Bde
Khulna  Jessore  Kushtia  Faridpur  Barisal  Patuakhali .	9 Inf Div	II Corps 9 Inf Div 4 Mtn Div

Notes 36 Adhoc Div had only 1x Inf Bde, and 1x Mor Bty

14 Inf Div & 39 Ad hoc Div had only 1x Fd Regt Arty each. 97 (I) Inf Bde was without arty.

16 Div had 2x Fd Regt Arty and 29 C (-)

9 Inf Div had 2x Inf Bdes, 1x Adhoc Bde, and 2x armd sqn.

Indian Eastern Command Reserve	6 Mountain Division less brigade HQ 2x Engineer Regiments and bomb disposal group
Airborne Forces	50 (I) ParaBrigade

  According to Clary (2013)

“East Pakistan was surrounded by India on three sides, resulting in a more than 4000-kilometer border between present-day Bangladesh and India. In such circumstances, shorter interior lines of communication can sometimes compensate for inferior numbers. In this case, the quantitative overmatch by Indian forces in the eastern theatre included six full divisions, portions of an additional mountain division and several brigades, and the equivalent of three armoured regiments.

Pakistan faced this force with three infantry divisions (two of which were without their normal accompaniment of artillery and vehicles). Two additional divisions were raised on an ad hoc basis out of spare brigades and division headquarters staff, and one regiment of light tanks ( The terrain of East Pakistan substantially discounted the utility of tanks).

At the theatre level, it is easy to argue India enjoyed 2:1 superiority- even without assuming any combat power for the 50,000-100,000 Bengali guerrilla forces operating in Pakistan’s eastern wing or on its periphery, a small portion of which had been organized into formal units by Indian trainers. Because Pakistani officials were wary that New Delhi would seize a portion of East Pakistan, from which they would announce a free Bangladesh state, the inferior Pakistan military force was arrayed along the perimeter of the eastern wing, rather than concentrating their forces in a smaller inner circle. The results were understandably catastrophic”. 

On the eastern front, the enemy overwhelmed the  Pakistani defences by superior forces, armour, artillery, and air. When most of the defences could not be overrun, the Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. Resultantly, till the cease-fire on 16^th December, the Indians did not capture a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. At Khulna, heavy fighting continued till 17^th December and ceased only after repeated orders by the surrendering Eastern command.

                                                                                  

Western Theatre

Order of Battle - 3^rd December 1971

Area of Ops	Pakistan	India
J&K	HoldingRole 12Div, 23Div*(+) NA Scouts Pen/CAttk  Role’ 2(I) Armd Bde(+)@;	Western Comd XV Corps 3,10,19,25, &27Inf Div; 1x (I) Inf Bde
Ravi-Chenab	Holding Role 8Div,15Div C Pen/ C Attk Role 6 Armd Div(-), 17 Div(-) 8(I)Armd Bde	I Corps 36,39, &54 Inf Div; 2(I)Armd Bde, 16(I)Armd Bde
Ravi-Sutlej	Holding Role 10 Div,11 Div; C Pen/C Attk Role 3(I) Armd Bde, 105 (I) Inf Bde Gp	XI Corps 15 Div,7Div,Foxtrot Div(adhoc); 1x(I) Armd Bde
South of Sutlej	Holding Role 18 Div	Southern Comd* 11Div,12Div;  2x(I)Armd Sqns; 1xMsl regt
Strategic Reserves	1Armd Div; 7Div,33 Div	1 Armd Div; 14 Div

Sources: Amin (1999); Katoch (2011)

Summary -Western Theatre

Formation	Pakistan	India	Remarks
Inf Div	10	14*	*1xDiv deployed   against Tibet
Armd Div	2	1
Indep Armd Bde	3	3
Indep Inf Bde	1	1

Notes:

1.   1. Brigade ex 17 Div Detached to Command 23 Div.

2.   2. 2x regts ex 6 Armd Div Detached to Command 8 (I) Armd Bde.

3.       Indian I Corps Sector stretched from Samba till short of the Dera Baba Nanak Enclave on the Ravi River. This was initially held by a division and presented to Pakistan the weakest gap in the Indian defences in the event of a preemptive attack. Located in the hinterland, 1 Corps was to assume responsibility for this sector on arrival. 

In his Order of the Day, broadcast on morning 4^th December 1971, Maneckshaw spelt out two Indian military objectives: 1) Capture of East Pakistan, and 2) Destruction of Pakistan’s military machine. Indian strategy was to remain on the defensive on the western front till its eastern command achieved its objective of reducing East Pakistan.

The war in the western theatre began when, on the evening of 3^rd December 1971, Pakistan Air Force launched a series of half-hearted attacks on the Indian airfields. About fifty aircraft were employed and the attacks failed to do any significant damage. This was followed by limited offensives the same night by the holding formations to secure footholds in the enemy territory. 

Both the armies held back from launching their main offensive and waited for the other side to make the major move. From Pakistan, no major operation was launched for fear that if territorial gains were made in the west, they might result in exchange for possible losses in East Pakistan, something that went against the strategy of letting East Pakistan go. Poonch was attacked by Pakistan Army on night 3^rd /4^th December through an infiltration operation. 

The Indian garrison at Poonch consisted of an infantry brigade (93 Brigade) while 12 Division had planned to infiltrate with two infantry brigades. The plan was practicable but failed because of irresolution at the divisional level, loss of surprise, poor logistic arrangements and stiff resistance by the Indian forces (Amin, 2002; Katoch, 2011).

The attack on Chamb, by 23 Division, was also launched on night 3^rd /4^th December. It was partially successful with Pakistan reaching up to the Munawar Tawi. Thereafter, the division established a bridgehead opposite Pallanwala across the Tawi to conduct further operations against Jaurian. However, Pakistan’s attempt to secure a bridgehead was halted on 10^th December when Major General Iftikhar, GOC 23 Division, was killed from injuries suffered in a helicopter crash, and the defences were stabilised along the Munawar Tawi.

In the Sialkot sector, Indian forces advanced up to Basantar Nala and, after fourteen days of fighting, contacted the town of Shakargarh (approximately 20 kilometres from the international border).

In the Jammu Region, the Chicken’s Neck area was captured by the Indians. Pakistan’s 4 Corps, holding the Ravi- Sutlej Corridor with two divisions against an equal number of Indian divisions, captured the Indian enclave opposite Hussainiwala Headworks. Pakistan’s 105 Brigade carried out a small-scale but highly aggressive operation in the Sulaimanke area opposite the Indian town of Fazilka, capturing the Bund ahead of Sabuna Distributary and ensuring the safety of Pakistan’s most crucial Sulaimanke Canal Headworks which was just 1,500 metres from the border. The Northern Areas, defended by scouts, were given very low priority. The Indians were, therefore, able to capture important posts overlooking Kargil-Leh Road and in Partapur Sector. 

To be continued

The author is a Pakistan Army veteran who regularly writes on national and international affairs, defence, military history, and military technology. His talks on these subjects are aired on his YouTube Channel "The Observation Post". His blog "Sam1953.blogspot.com" features his articles. Tweets @saleemakhtar53.