71 WAR - THE EASTERN FRONT

According to Clary (2013);

 “East Pakistan was surrounded by India on three sides, resulting in a more than a 4000-kilometer border between present-day Bangladesh and India. In such circumstances, shorter interior lines of communication can sometimes compensate for inferior numbers.

 In this case, the quantitative overmatch by Indian forces in the eastern theatre included six full divisions, portions of an additional mountain division and several brigades, and the equivalent of three armoured regiments. 

 Pakistan faced this force with three infantry divisions (two of which were without their normal accompaniment of artillery and vehicles). Two additional divisions were raised on an ad hoc basis out of spare brigades and division headquarters staff, and one regiment of light tanks ( The terrain of East Pakistan substantially discounted the utility of tanks).

 At the theatre level, it is easy to argue India enjoyed 2:1 superiority- even without assuming any combat power for the 50,000-100,000 Bengali guerrilla forces operating in Pakistan’s eastern wing or on its periphery, a small portion of which had been organized into formal units by Indian trainers. 

Because Pakistani officials were wary that New Delhi would seize a portion of East Pakistan, from which they would announce a free Bangladesh state, the inferior Pakistan military force was arrayed along the perimeter of the eastern wing, rather than concentrating their forces in a smaller inner circle. The results were understandably catastrophic”.

Order of Battle

Pakistan	India
36 Adhoc Div	101 Comm Zone 95Mtn Bde FJ Sector Bde 167 Inf Bde  5 Mtn Bde
14 Inf Div 39 Adhoc Div  97 (I) Inf Bde	IV Corps 8 Mtn Div 57 Mtn Div 23 Mtn Div
16 Inf Div	XXXIII Corps 20 Mtn Div 6 Mtn Div 50 (I) Para Bde 71 Mtn Bde  MF Bde
9 Inf Div	II Corps 9 Inf Div 4 Mtn Div
-	Reserve 6 Mtn Div
-	50 ( I )Para Bde

Note: Adhoc Divisions were ghost headquarters raised to deceive the Indians. 36 Adhoc Division had only 1x brigade. 14 Infantry  Division  and 39 Adhoc Division each  had only 1x Field Regiment  Artillery 

The dice were so heavily loaded against Pakistan, and Maneckshaw was so confident of India’s victory, that he had got the document of surrender prepared even before the start of the war: 

“I was so sure that I will win that I had personally dictated the surrender document to headquarters Eastern Command and ordered them to make four copies.I asked them to give one copy to General Jagjit Singh Aurora, one copy to Niazi, one copy to the government (of India, sic), and one copy I will keep in my office….. (After the ceasefire) I told Jagjit Singh ‘this is a great day for you. Take your wife along (to accompany you at the surrender ceremony, sic)’.* 

*Transcript of the interview given to Bharat Defence Kavach

China had clearly told Pakistan that in case of a war with India,it would not be able to help Pakistan. It had advised Pakistan to seek a political solution to the problem. According to Kissinger, the United States was favourably disposed towards the creation of Bangladesh, but in a peaceful manner.

  In the eastern theatre, India enjoyed more than 2:1 superiority in ground forces and 10:1 superiority in the air. As in 1965, India had an additional advantage of transferring its mountain divisions from the China border to either of the war theatres, which it did. The Pakistan Army high command had no illusions about the outcome of the war in the east.

 What they were immensely bothered about was saving  West Pakistan when three Indian corps, freed from the eastern theatre, would shift to the west. Ostensibly, they decided to save West Pakistan.

 As for Bhutto, he aimed at getting rid of both the Bengalis as well as the Pakistan Army. Why? As his subsequent moves substantiated, Bhutto was wary that he could not come to power in a united Pakistan. He also believed that the army was the biggest hurdle in his quest for untrammeled power.

It is alleged that Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the Air Chief, and Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan, Chief of the General Staff of the Pakistan Army, were in cahoots with Bhutto. After the war, Gul Hassan was promoted as Army Chief, but shortly thereafter forced to resign unceremoniously along with Rahim Khan. Later, both Gul Hassan and Rahim Khan were given ambassadorial assignments.

Escalation

 Pakistan’s military high command responded to the covert Indian misinformation that India was only interested in occupying a small chunk of East Pakistan to establish a government of independent Bangladesh in order to put pressure on Pakistan to abandon its Eastern wing. The original plan was therefore replaced by a new plan which called for dispersal of formations and their deployment along the border with India. These thinned-out units were under orders to stand their ground until the very end. Meanwhile, the western front would be activated by Pakistan with the aim to divert Indian Army pressure away from East Pakistan.

Conduct of Operations

Indian forces crossing the border, launched a full-scale invasion in East Pakistan on night 20th /21st November 1971, attacking simultaneously as many as 23 salients along the border. The purpose of these attacks was to knock the Pakistani forces away from the border and gain space for the establishment of firm bases to be used subsequently for launching major attacks.

 In many places, these attacks were beaten back by the defenders. However, the much larger Indian forces kept the defenders embroiled. The Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation of a state of emergency. 

In his Order of the Day, broadcast on morning 4th December 1971, Maneckshaw spelled out two Indian military objectives: 1) Capture of East Pakistan, and 2) Destruction of Pakistan’s military machine. Indian strategy was to remain on the 116 defensive on the western front till its eastern command achieved its objective of reducing East Pakistan.

 On the eastern front, the enemy overwhelmed the Pakistani defences by superior forces, armour, artillery, and air. When most of the defences could not be overrun, the Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. Resultantly, till the cease-fire on 16th December, the Indians did not capture a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. At Khulna, heavy fighting continued till 17th December and ceased only after repeated orders by the surrendering Eastern command.

Saleem Akhtar Malik

17 November 2021