The Truth about Asal Uttar
In the Kasur/Khem Karan sector BRB canal flows along a north-south alignment. Radcliffe Line runs to the east of BRB, almost parallel to the canal up to a place called Ballanwala. From there onward it takes a U-turn that forms the Indian Khem Karan enclave. Next to the enclave, an inverted U-turn forms the Pakistani Sehjra salient. Khem Karan-Amritsar railway line divides the area between Ballanwala and Khem Karan. Immediately to the east of the international border, the area of operations was like an inverted horseshoe, its apex pointing towards Pakistan. To the north of the railway line, the area is bounded by Kasur Drain which meanders northeast to southwest between Bhikkiwind and Ballanwala.
To the south of the railway line Rohi Nullah, flowing in a southeasterly direction, finally drains into the Sutlej River. An all-weather road connects Khem Karan with Amritsar through Bhikkiwind. In 1965, Asal Uttar, Valtoha, and Dibbipura formed a major clutch of villages to the east of road Khem Karan – Bhikkiwind. Within the area flow two major canals, Kasur Branch and Sobraon Branch. The entire area can be easily inundated through these canals and their distributaries Cris- crossing its whole length and breadth. In 1965, fields of fire were available maximum up to 1000 meters and were generally restricted by thick vegetation and standing crops. Traffic-ability is poor and, during peacetime armour exercises, the Mechanical Transport Officer (MTO) of the armoured regiment is a very busy man recovering the bogged down vehicles.
*
TDU or Tank Delivery Unit was a
euphemism for “armour regiment” to circumvent the ceiling on raising of new
armour regiments through U.S funding. These were not tank-destroyer units, as
erroneously reported by the Indian authors.
Indians attacked all along the front on night 5th /6th September. Whereas Pakistan’s 52 Brigade and 106 Brigade were to defend the Kasur Sector along the BRB canal, 21 Brigade was located at Luliani (northwest of Kasur along Road Lahore-Kasur) and was 11 Division reserve for the counter-attack.
At around 0500 hours, replicating 10 Division’s chaotic response to the Indian attack in Lahore Sector, 11 Division units hurried up to occupy their defensive positions along the BRB canal just as the Indian offensive was unfurling itself. To the south of Ballanwala, Indian 62 Mountain Brigade (18 Rajputana Rifles, 9 J&K Rifles, and 13 Dogra) supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse captured Sehjra Salient and Rohi Nullah Bund. To the north, 7 Mountain Brigade (4 Grenadiers, 7 Grenadiers, and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles), also supported by squadron, ex Deccan Horse, failed to capture its assigned objectives – Ballanwala and the bridges to its north.
Fighting went on throughout the day. Counter-attacking all along the front, 11 Division regained balance, threw back the enemy, and recovered the area on the far bank of BRB, including Sehjra Salient. During the battles on 6th September, 7 Grenadiers (7 Mountain Brigade) and 13 Dogra (62 Mountain Brigade) suffered such heavy casualties that they ceased to exist as cohesive units. Meanwhile 4 Mountain Division managed to withdraw to the general area Asal Uttar. According to Chakravorty (2014):
“The withdrawal took place on September 07, and our troops were able to dig defences and lay mines. The three field companies laid the mines and the areas to the south and west of the defences were flooded. Pakistan allowed the division to prepare its defences methodically by not disturbing it on September 07”
Pakistan’s 11 Division could not interfere because it was haltingly attempting to establish a bridgehead across Rohi Nullah.
Order of Battle
|
Pakistan |
India |
|
1Armd Div 4 Cavalry 5 Horse 6 Lancers 24 Cavalry 19 Lancers 12 Cavalry (Recce Regt)
|
2(I)Armd Bde 3 Cavalry 8 Cavalry (Recce Regt) 4 Mtn Div 2x Mtn Bdes Deccan Horse |
The Battles of Asal Uttar
Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division had
3x armoured brigades (3, 4, and 5). Pakistani armour comprised a mix of M-47, M-48, and Chafee (recce regiment) tanks. Facing 1 Armoured Division (4 Cavalry, 5 Horse, 6 Lancers, 24 Cavalry, 19 Lancers, and 12 Cavalry) were Indian 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (3 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry) and 4 Mountain Division (2x mountain brigades and Deccan Horse).
7 FF and 10 FF, were mechanized infantry battalions whereas 1FF was plain infantry. It should be kept in mind that mechanized infantry provides intimate infantry support to tanks. It assaults and clears the enemy defences overrun by tanks. We can calculate the relative combat power in the Kasur sector as follows.
We assign a combat power value of 3 to an armoured division, 2 to an Independent armoured brigade, and 1 to a mountain division. However, due to attrition caused during 72 hours of battling the 11 Division defences, on 8th September, the effective utilization of 4 Mountain Division was reduced to approximately four infantry battalions. Therefore the combat power of the 4 Mountain Division should be considered 0 .5. We have not counted Pakistan’s 11 Division because it was in the holding role.
Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 6.25 for India and 9 for Pakistan or a 1.44 to 1 Pakistani superiority in the Kasur sector. Pakistan launched the counter-stroke with its 1 Armoured Division in Khem Karan area. According to the official history (Riza, 1984):
"1 Armoured Division “was required to debouch from a bridgehead provided by 11 Division and cut Grand Trunk road in area Jullunder, an advance of approximately 100 miles into India”.
This aim was beyond the capability of 1 Armoured Division and was probably inserted into the operational order for psychological reasons, to raise the flagging morale of own rank and file. The actual motivation for launching the armoured division was to threaten the Indian XI Corps left flank with a view to relieving pressure on the 10 Division.
Indian war historians prefer to portray Asal Uttar as a monolithic battle where Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division was routed by the Indian 4 Mountain Division and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade. In fact, a series of armour battles took place at and around Asal Uttar between 8th and 11th September. The bridgehead on Rohi Nullah was made during night 6th /7th September by 2FF, under command 52 Brigade. This was a holding brigade responsible for defending the area from inclusive road Kasur-Khem Karan to inclusive road Kasur-Ferozepur.
5Armoured Brigade, the leading brigade, could not be inducted into the bridgehead on the same night because of engineers' delay in the construction of the bridge on the nullah. When the bridge finally became operational, the leading tank (6 Lancers) hit the bridge railing and plunged into the nullah, blocking all the traffic across the bridge and delaying the induction of armour into the bridgehead.
At about 1800 hours on 7th September, squadron 6 Lancers, followed by company 1 FF, still struggling on the far bank, broke out in an attempt to expand the bridgehead. Being plain infantry, 1 FF did not have mobility compatible with armour. Advancing approximately two miles ahead of the nullah, this force had to withdraw for the night leaguer.
An armoured formation breaking out of the bridgehead is always followed in zone by an infantry formation. At dusk, the armour hands over the area up to the line of control (forward edge of the area cleared by the armour) to the follow in zone infantry formation which then establishes its defences along the line against enemy counter-attacks.
Normally, the formation establishing the bridgehead also acts as follow in zone infantry after the armour has broken out. With the tasks given to 1 Armoured Division, there should have been an infantry division following in zone. We have seen that, what to talk about follow in zone infantry, in this sector, there was not even enough infantry to establish the bridgehead.
Hence , between 8th and 11th September, 1 Armoured Division had been advancing into the enemy territory, attacking the enemy, and then withdrawing at night due to the absence of infantry to hold ground won by the armour during the day. Talking about mechanized infantry, which followed its own armour, it was sufficient only to clear minor enemy opposition.It also reinforced the night leaguer by deploying at its outer perimeter or getting tucked into the gaps between the tank positions.
We have mentioned that, due to attrition caused during 72 hours of battling the 11 Division defences, the effective utilization of 4 Mountain Division was reduced to approximately four infantry battalions. These, along with the remnants of 7 Grenadiers and 13 Dogra, were now deployed in an all-round defence around Asal Uttar.
Deccan Horse was deployed forward, to the southeast of divisional defences. As for 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, 3 Cavalry was deployed south of Dibbipura and west of the divisional gun area. Squadron, ex 8 Cavalry was located at Voltoha. The rest of the regiment was located a few kilometers northwest of Voltoha.
As mentioned earlier, in Phase 1 of the Pakistani offensive, 11 Division had already established a shallow bridgehead of sorts across Rohi Nullah with 2 FF ex 52 Brigade. Later on, the entire brigade was tasked to expand the bridgehead. The D day was delayed from 7th to 8th September due to the damage caused to the bridge on Rohi Nullah.
In Phase 2, 1 Armoured Division was to break out from the bridgehead along three axes: 4 Armoured Brigade to advance along Sobraon Branch and capture the bridges on Beas. ; 5 Armoured Brigade to advance on road Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind-Amritsar, remaining west of Kasur Branch; 12 Cavalry recce regiment) to advance along Kasur Branch and secure bridges en route; 3 Armoured Brigade to be in reserve.
Between 8th and 11th September, the brigades of 1 Armoured Division launched a series of attacks against the enemy dug up around Asal Uttar. 5 Armoured Brigade again broke out from the bridgehead at 0700 hours on 8th September. Undercover artillery fire the advancing tanks moved within 900 meters of the enemy’s defended area. At this point, they were engaged by tanks of Deccan Horse.
The Pakistani armour broke up into smaller groups and tried to infiltrate the enemy defences by carrying out an outflanking move. The Indians employed their tanks like pillboxes. Utilizing standing crops, the attackers were engaged by Deccan Horse, artillery fire, and tank hunting teams. Suffering heavy losses, Pakistanis retreated.
During most of the attacks, the tanks were disabled on the minefields and effectively engaged by artillery, anti-tank weapons, and Indian tanks lying in ambush under cover of sugar cane crops. Wherever they tried to outflank the defender, Pakistani tanks were either bogged down or were channelized by the inundations into killing areas where they were destroyed at leisure.
In spite of taking casualties more casualties and tanks being bogged, 4 Cavalry pushed forward, outflanking Asal Uttar from the south, and by sunset, were in the vicinity of Chima. Only ten tanks of 4 Cavalry managed to reach the depth of the enemy locality. During the night many crews of 4 Cavalry abandoned their bogged down tanks, and four officers, including the CO and 21 soldiers were taken, prisoners. According to Hamid :
The Indians claim credit for inundating the area, but in fact, only some patches were deliberately flooded; The remaining flooding was caused by the tanks breaking the banks of minor canals and distributaries. The terrain was generally firm, but the major friction was caused by the tall sugarcane crops, which the Indian tanks and recoilless rifles used to their advantage.
By 11th September, having suffered heavy casualties, and with CO 4 Cavalry captured along with many of his officers, 1Armoured Division had lost its steam. According to Chakravorty (2014), Pakistan lost 97 tanks (including 32 tanks bogged down and captured in running condition) as against Indian losses of 5 tanks. According to Riza (1984), 24 Indian tanks were destroyed between 6th and 10th September, which appears to be a more realistic estimate.
Notwithstanding the alleged superiority of Patton tanks, Pakistani and Indian armour, as discussed earlier, possessed almost equal combat power in Kasur sector. The combat power of Pakistani armour was further degraded by the channelized terrain where Indian armour had transitioned into a defensive posture.
The 4 Sikh Fiasco
With the withdrawal of the bulk of 1 armoured division from the Kasur sector, Harbaksh thought that Khem Karan could be retaken. To this end, the Indians launched several attacks to recover the lost ground. The first attack by the Indian Army to recapture Khem Karan came on 12th September.
The attack was launched with an infantry brigade supported by a squadron of tanks. As part of the brigade operation, 4 Sikh, newly brought from 7 Div, was to launch the main attack from the east after a fighting patrol had infiltrated and established a roadblock behind Khem Karan on the road to Kasur.
The attacking 4 Sikh was caught between the tanks of 15 Lancers and 6 Lancers, with the result that the whole of the 4 Sikh along with the CO were captured. As for the fighting patrol, as they moved forward, they suddenly found themselves amid a company of the enemy and were also taken, prisoner. Meanwhile, on the same day, i.e. 12th September, Indians lost seven tanks in skirmishes along the main road.
Whereas the Pakistani counteroffensive in the Khem Karan sector had failed, it had succeeded in thwarting the Indian offensive aimed at capturing Lahore by advancing along the Khem Karan – Kasur axis. Moreover, Khem Karan was still held by the Pakistan Army.
The Indian offensives along Amritsar-Lahore and Khalra –Burki axes having been already contained, the Indians now opened a new front in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor The Armoured Division was ordered to suspend operation in the Kasur sector and, with 4 Armoured Brigade, move north.
In the Khem Karan sector, though the Pakistani armour had to pay a heavy price, the Indian offensive against Lahore was blunted and the Pakistan Army threw the enemy beyond Khem Karan.
Saleem Akhtar Malik
30 September,2021
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