The Wounded Giant! Is it prudent for Pakistan’s foreign policy planners to rebuff the United States after its misadventure in Afghanistan?

The United States is pulling out its forces, and those of its allies, from Afghanistan. This is happening after a futile war that lasted for a little less than twenty years – America's longest overseas war! 

The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan began in October 2001in response to the September 11, 2001, attack on New York’s Twin Towers. The US alleged that Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization, had masterminded the attack. Al Qaeda was supported by the Taliban, then ruling Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden, the Al Qaeda mastermind, was at that time hiding in Afghanistan and the Taliban had refused the US demand to hand him over.

  Before invading Afghanistan the US, to the point of bullying, had grabbed Pakistan’s support in the “war against terrorism”. According to Musharraf, Pakistan’s military ruler in 2001, the US had threatened to “bomb Pakistan into the stone age” if it did not comply with the US demands.

Pakistan was thus coerced into facilitating the US in its Afghan war. This had happened after Pakistan served as America’s “Most Allied Ally” during the Cold War, a period during which, according to John Foster Dulles, India had been "sitting on the fence" under Nehru's enigmatic concept of Non-Alignment. As a result of the US coercion, Pakistan provided its airspace for transportation of coalition troops and equipment to the Afghan war zone, and for launching drone attacks in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. American drone attacks were carried out under the pretext of targeting the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants who used Pakistani territory as marshaling areas for conducting operations against the coalition forces. Whereas scores of militants were killed in these drone attacks, the attacks also caused heavy collateral damage to innocent civilians. According to the Department of State, during the last twenty years, the US had spent around USD 800 billion on its military operations in Afghanistan. The US strategy to sledgehammer the militants should have completely decimated the Afghan resistance. The opposite happened, forcing the US to start negotiations with the Taliban.

  Why had the US-led coalition forces, despite their tremendous firepower, failed in Afghanistan?

In the rough terrain of Afghanistan, the coalition forces, mostly mechanized, were ineffective against small Taliban groups which used hit and run tactics and did not present a tangible target to the enemy. In mountainous terrain and built-up areas, armor protection and firepower give a false sense of security to the tank crews and infantrymen cloistered inside the APCs/IFVs. Even with a combined armor-infantry attack against a static defense to clear the objective overrun by the tanks, mechanized infantry is of little value unless it dismounts, runs through the minefield, attacks the defender, and overcomes the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. This is what some of the armies trained in mechanized warfare are averse to. This is why the Soviet forces had failed in Afghanistan. 

The same happened to the US-led coalition forces. Colonel Imam, an ISI handler of the Afghan Mujahideen, who had participated in the Mujahedeen’s various battles against the Soviet troops, considered the Soviet soldiers head and shoulders above the American troops who streamed into Afghanistan during the US invasion. Imam was killed by the Pakistani Taliban in the wake of 9/11. 

Moreover, during the twenty years of the presence of Coalition forces in Afghanistan, they had failed to raise the Afghan National Army to a level where it could take on the Taliban after the withdrawal. The US is beating a retreat from Afghanistan without achieving even a few of its strategic objectives for which it had invaded this country. Twenty years is too long a period to be called a “hasty retreat”. The US now wants Pakistan to provide military bases from which it intends to control the situation in Afghanistan. This time, considering its experience spanning more than half a century of a roller-coaster relationship between the two countries, Pakistan is in no mood to oblige Uncle Sam. In the prevailing scenario, is it prudent for Pakistan’s foreign policy planners to snub the wounded giant? 

  Despite the bitter experiences in the past, Pakistan needs the US even as the US needs Pakistan’s help for its face-saving in Afghanistan. 

The relationship between the two countries had always been transactional, and it should remain such in the future also. Whereas Pakistan has come a long way in achieving self-reliance in most of its defense requirements, it still has a very fragile economy that needs indirect financial support and cutting-edge military technology which only the US can provide. 

The specter of remaining on the FATF gray list and the need for heavy loan transfusions from IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, will keep Pakistan dependent on the United States for times to come. 

Despite the rhetoric about refusing military bases to the United States, Pakistan is a "Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)". According to the US Department of State, MNNA status provides Pakistan certain benefits in the areas of defense, trade, and security cooperation. Whereas the defense and trade cooperation with Pakistan is conveniently muted by the US, it demands security cooperation from Pakistan. This security cooperation, in the context of the US-Pakistan relationship, commits Pakistan to provide its airspace to the US for carrying out future military operations in Afghanistan. 

Bases or no bases, US transport and combat aircraft will continue to use Pakistan's airspace not only for provisioning the US-installed Afghan government(s), but also for launching its airpower through drones, helicopter gunships, and fighter aircraft to hit the Taliban targets. There will be an American air corridor, linking Qatar with Kabul that will continue to operate through the Pakistani airspace even after the withdrawal of the Coalition forces from Afghanistan. 

Pakistan also needs to bring China and the US together by removing the US apprehensions and misunderstandings about CPEC. For this to happen, US sensitivities and fears about Chinese activities in the India – Pacific region should be addressed. 

What happens in the South China Sea, particularly the Strait of Malacca, is closely linked with CPEC. China is developing CPEC to counter the US plan for blockading the Strait of Malacca in the event of a war between the US and China. 

The US, goaded by India, is contemplating embarking on yet another series of Quixotic adventures in the South China region. To facilitate this, the US is providing COMCASA compatible equipment to India to snoop on the Chinese navy and air force. 

Reportedly, the US wants India to monitor the Chinese submarine traffic through the Strait of Malacca and, if possible, block it for the Chinese shipping in a future war. Western think tanks say that India can easily block Chinese shipping by parking a few ships at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca. This is a hare-brained scheme. 

The Strait of Malacca, if blocked, will be blocked for all maritime traffic that passes through it. Short of providing bases to the US, Pakistan should bargain for the fruition of its strategic goals and interests. These may be translated into a win-win relationship between the two hitherto estranged allies. To sum up:

 1. Pakistan should continue to work with the US, Russia, and China, the three major strategic players, for the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan. 

2. The US should understand Pakistan’s concerns about according India a role in Afghanistan. 

3. The US air corridor through Pakistan’s airspace should function without threatening Pakistan’s security and sovereignty. 

4. Pakistan’s requirement for US military  hardware should be guaranteed by the US. 5. Pakistan and China should invite the US to join the CPEC by removing the US sensitivities and concerns about it.

Saleem AkhtarMalik